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CHAPTER I
TRIE SEARGi FOR MEANINGFUL ILLUSION
Three years before he died, Henry Janes had come to feel that
his work was a "tangle of temporal differences that revealed, afterall, nothing of the depths; references as fleeting as C. Henry's
slang, flavours mistaken for essences, split hairs, not dissected
anatomies,"*
It is pertinent that in Jaaes's misgivings here quoted he refers
to 0. Henry for self-comparison: 0. Henry of the facile tale with
the trick ending, tale-teller extraordinary, but artist seldom. For
Jases cams closest to failing as an artist when h@ seems to be purely
a story-teller, a fabricator, a word conjurer who pulls us along
hypnotically by the spell of his rhetoric, a writer who merely enter
tains us, leaving us with no philosophy after the illusion. He cones
precipitously close to this in stories like "The Beast in the Jungle"
and "The Aspern Papers"—tales fro» which only the discerning reader
can draw a deeper Bteaniag, As a story teller Janes is also like his
modem counterpart (in style, not content), William Faulkner, who, on
cursory examination, seems to be a carnival charlatan, a clever artist
who plays a shell gane with his reader, trying to convince hia there

%. Forster Damon, /toy Lowell, as recorded in Van Wyck Brook's
New England Indian Su»»er, 1865-1915 (New York: E, P. Dutton Co.,
I n c . , l W o ), p . 4 0 6 .
— — —
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is a moral seed beneath the convolutin^ shell of his story, when
(except for the discerning) there doesn't sees to be one there at
all.
If Jaraes were merely a story teller, a magician who beguiles
his reader into suspending his disbelief only so long as his words
were effective, he would be suspect as an artist. His technique wight
be admired, but his creative insight would be questioned*
fact, is James's position in literature today.

This, in

As a craftsman, as

a dedicated artist, he is above suspicion. Almost every critic
maintains the indebtedness of the modem literary technician to Janes.
But almost every critic qualifies his praise by saying that the world
James portrays seems to have too little relation to reality as they
see it, particularly the world mirrored in his later works. Critics
admire James's portrayals of "fine consciences," but at the sane tiise
they imply that these consciences never have existed other than in
the concentricity of rainds—Jaaes's and the reader's; or that if
they have existed, they so little reflect a representational world
that they can safely be ignored.
It is Joseph Conrad who referred to Jwes as "the historian of
fine consciences."2

In fact, it is Conrad who has said some of the

Host complimentary and enlightening things about Janes. Yet despite

the fact that James himself often referred to the novel as "history,"

Joseph Conrad, "The Historian of Fine Consciences," essay in
Hie Question of Henry James, (ed.) F. i*<*. Dupee (New York: Henry
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this might have seemed—-even coming from Conrad—a limiting tribute,
since to Jaaes the word "history" had a vary particular (even private)
meaning. "History," to hi® was not the "pigeon-holed and documented"
chronicle which he associated with Zola, and which he referred to as
"experience by imitation.""' The artistic image "is always," he says,
"superior [italics nine] to the thing itself,"4
As a historian who diligently imitates the actual (the ••temporal,"
as he calls it in his daaning self-evaluation, p. 1), imbuing it with
no "essence" of its own, James is purposely not as convincing as he
at first seess. Who, for instance, could believe that one of his
aost "realistic" characters, Christopher Newman, in The American,is
at all true to the actual? Such a person, in real life, would have
to be endowed with the physical drive and energy of a tycoon, yet be,
at the same tirae, as sensitive as Henry James himself.
Rather, it is because Janes fails as a historian (in the usual
sense of the term) that he succeeds as an artist. He is an historian
only to the extent that he convinces us that the individual kind of
reality he has captured is not raerely fanciful.
Sir Phillip Sidney has said that art is more philosophical than
history and more concrete than philosophy. Goethe, the romanticclassicist, said that art gives an illusion of a higher reality; and

%

Henry Jaaes, "Eoile Zola, Hie Future of the Novel (ed.) Leon
Edel (New York: Vintage Books, l§S5f»y,'"p.""''i'sST
————
4Ibid,,

"Hustave Flaubert," p. 1S4.

4

when he used the word illusion in this way, Goethe was not meaning only
the image art creates by being something other than reality, lie was
rephrasing the classical concept that initation is a creative act.
The artist does not necessarily imitate life exactly m it appears.
Naturalists in American literature, such as Frank Norris, Theodore
Dreiser and Sinclair Lewis did this; and they too often succeeded,
creating in the process what Irving Babbitt has called a "literal
deception," or, as the critic, Yvor Winters, has rephrased the terra,
"the fallacy of imitative form," That is, the reality the literary
naturalists captured (Zola and, even, Flaubert being the European
practitioners of the xaethod), a reality which may be literally true,
is still a deception because, for all its pretensions of capturing
"real" life—titat is, of evading the "illusory"—it is illusory still,
and it is possibly no less illusory than is an "idealized," classical
illusion, which makes "illusion" an integral part of reality,
The problem, of course, is what is "reality" and what is "illusion"?—
a question anyone would be foolhardy to try to answer absolutely. And
this is just the point. The classicist does not presuae to answer it
absolutely. He does not try to get absolutely beyond illusion.

With

out presuming to limit reality (whatever it is) the way the naturalists,
for instance, limit it to its purely objective properties, the classic
cist uses illusion for whatever value it has as a point of reference
reflecting back to reality. He approaches the problem of reality and
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illusion more circumspectly, more indirectly,5 rather than attempting
to evade it by defining it too easily and thus dismissing it too
shallowly. Thus he gives to the question of reality and illusion the
latitude the problem denands, and, at the same tirae, he keeps it rsore
inclusive. If he limits it at all, he limits it by insisting that
reality is also illusion.
This, of course, is paradoxical; and to approach the problem of
paradox is only to draw very near to the core of Henry James*s fiction.
To examine one is to exa»ine the other. To presums, for instance,
that realistic art continues to present reality only so long as it
continues to present illusion is to presume that life, as a continuum,
is also illusion. And to presutae that art should do no sore or less
than imitate this illusive continuum is to be more paradoxical still.
But this—it will be discovered—is exactly what Jams demands of the
artist. Inevitably one is thrown into soae consideration of the
mystical realm, where the critical laind finds all its disciplines
thwarted.6

For as long as there are contrasts, as long as there is

C
James's method of indirection will be examined sore closely in
the next chapter.
6It

is not the purpose of this thesis to exaaine James as a
potential mystic (which, by almost any criterion he is not); yet
he realises mystical kind of awareness by some of the sm means
particularly in his use of paradox, in his attempt to airror, rather
than to eliminate contraries, etc. (to be discussed later)'". The
paradox of the mystical experience, as asserted by all mystics* pseudo
or otherwise (by those who profess it authoritatively as well as by
those who profess it less authoritatively, perhaps, only because
thoy sees less sure of the artistic taeans) is that the experience
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play of light and shadow, of illusion and reality, paradox will find
expression. Hie irony of paradox is that it is always as much a
reflection of the beholder's eye as it is of life itself. Even the
word is only an arbitrary ftilcrura by which one balances contraries
which possibly do not exist at all in total reality. Dualistic words
like "good and evil," "beauty and ugliness," etc., aanage to halve
the world into contraries which oay not exist at all except in the
minds of those who use thetaj and in this sense paradox may be no more
central than the illusions it opposes. Irving Babbitt, for instance,
says that one of the »ost "delicate of tasks" is:
. . . t o d e t e r m i n e whether a paradox occupies a
position more or less central than the convention
to which it is opposed [and that] a somewhat similar
problem is to determine which of two conventions
has the greater degree of centrality, for me con
vention nay as compared to another seem highly

cannot be truly conveyed, iaigistically or otherwise, much less judged
or defined. As Eckhart says, The "unspeakable" quality the aystic
apprehends "hath no image"—a staggering assumption which attacks
conventional conceptions of reality which, by most definitions, are
not averse to imigistic or conceptual translation. What this
Means is that all systics* pseudo or otherwise, who try to communi
cate the experience (that is, to translate total reality) practice
a paradox no less bewildering than the paradoxes they express.
Mysticism infuriates the critical Rind most of all, because
the aystic asserts that he has apprehended a reality of which the
nan-mystic is not only unaware (the awareness is the experiences
everyone is a potential toystic at every moaent7"~^ut is not aware
of it); but furthermore he asserts that even if the experience is
in any way communicated (which, of course, would be, in every case
a compromise with total communication), the experience still cannot
be judged critically. By William J«ses*s criterion of "the
fruits," the mystical experience "words," if at all, only for the
individual who experiences it; and, in every case, the person who
experiences it is "tWe sole judge*

7
7
paradoxical,

Babbitt here is riot trying to dispose of paradox as a useful
entity; ho is trying to bring it into perspective. That is, he does
not want to permit it to be forced, arbitrarily, out of perspective
as a respectable measuring tool, as a useful means of judging
illusions.
As long as people are confused about reality and illusion,
paradox will find expression in art no less readily than it appears
in life, tod the nore complex the Binds that view it, the more
complex will be the paradoxes demanded. If a work of art does not,
for ironical teaperawents, somehow embody paradox, it will itself
beeoiae, for a large portion of the public, an object of irony. This
is the public James was referring to when he said, in "The Future
of the Novel"?
. . . T h e r e is . . . a n a d r a i r a b l e a i n o r i t y of
intelligent persons , , . for whan the very for®
[of the novel] has, equally at its best and its
worst, been ever a mockery ... [a class]. » .
beginning to be visably augmented by a different
circle altogether, the group of the formerly
subject, but now estranged, the deceived and bored,
those for whoa the [novel] too decidely fails to
live up to its possibilities.8
Only the most complex (though net, necessarily, the aost deeply

7Irving

Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticista (Boston and Mew
York, Houghton Mifflin &>., 143irr ]>. 246.
^lienry James, lite Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. 56,

s
profound) art achieves the Illusion of providing a play of paradoxes
which is not easily sounded. This kind of art so interweaves the
stuff of reality and illusion that even critical winds can temporarily
resign to it. What distinguishes this artistic fusion is that the work
of art remains an illusion which nore effectively escapes irony on the
part of the beholder (and admitted illusion is_illusion which has been
disproved ironically) and wore durably remains paradox. It remains
paradox because it wore expertly balances a vaster combination of
opposing entities: the idea and the "picture" (Janes's dichotomies),
the abstract idea and the concrete fact, the symbol and the image, the
i1lusory and the real. Purely imitative art, which is flat and uneliptical, seldom achieves this balance, because its paradoxes are
too easily dissolved.
In drama, for instance, our minds are induced into a play by
what Coleridge calls the "suspension of disbelief." But because of
the opposites Which mm apparent between an illusory tale and the
very renl~see&ing situations, our minds are forced to make a choice
between the illusion as it is perforned and reality as we know it to
be. The necessity of choosing is what fives the play any power it
has. Unconsciously, intuitively perhaps, we do not want to make this
choice. We want to be involved in the illusion. This is the romantic
faculty of the raind* We want to be suspended in disbelief. But
consciously, rationally, no doubt, we are forced to choose between the
real and the illusory. In fact, it is just this critical, ironical
faculty of our minds that lets us surrender to the illusion in the
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first place, it knows that no matter how realistic or frightening
the illusion may becone, it is still only an illusion. The choice
the rational faculty of the mind makes, if the play is bad, is satire
of roraance, of illusion, because the play has not had the power to
suspend our disbelief. In that case we become ironists—ironical
critics laughing at our desire for illusion.
If the artist hopes to capture complex winds he nust create an
illusion in which the most complex paradoxes reign. His work must
be a consciously controlled atteapt to reflect life's paradoxicalness
Itselfj that is, the greatest mystery of life, which is its ambiguity.
If the work does this, it will involve the reader emotionally as well.
It will involve hint emotionally, because if he becomes involved
intellectually in judging illusions, he will have to work himself out
of this mysterious substance to the degree that ho is trapped in it.
He will be involved emotionally, in other words, to the degree that
he is in illusion; and to the degree that he is bothered by illusion
and Is anxious to becoae grounded in reality once iaore, he will be
emotional. And to Janes to involve the reader emotionally, to "bewilder"
hi», is to win aore titan italf the artistic battle.
In this sense, art reflects man*® confusion about the difference
between reality and illusion. It plays upon his inclination to think
he knows, at each raonent, what is real and what is illusory and can
distinguish between each to the credit of his sanity. Vet it involves
hi» in an illusion which will cause hiis to be temporarily confused about
tiiis distinction. If the illusion is responsibly presented, it will
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be one which the reader can unravo1 and which will lead hira to a more
meaningful illusion beyond it (that is, to a new "transcendant" reality,
beyond mere illusory entertainment or literal deception}. To the ex
tent that it does this—that it draws him through illusion and out of
it again and stands hiia on his feet again in apparent "reality," it
leads him out of paradox; that is, it forces hie to realize that desire
for illusion at the same time one really desires reality is itself
paradoxical.
If the work of art deserts him in a state of paradox, in a state
of ambiguity, in a state of confusion about what illusion and reality
are (in the particular case); if, that is, it does not stand him on
his feet, even if wily temporarily, in a new kind of transcendent
illusion, the work is itself, finally, paradoxical, and therefore
Q
ambiguous*
A work of art convinces a reader that either reality is ambiguous
and paradoxical and contradictory, or that he is. Art thus accepts
paradox and demands an illusion which cannot be dissolved. Yet if the
paradoxical illusion is respensibily presented; that is, if it is
distinguished by a classical propensity for demanding and making
distinctions, it will be one which can be dissipated—if only for the
purpose of providing temporary respite from paradox and illusion,

9A

case in point is Melville's, The Confidence Man, in no sense
ambiguous in itself. Absolutely misantKroplc in that it puts out of
mind the light of hope for all man, and thus is internally consistent,
it is still paradoxical in that the artist's purpose in revealing this
truth to man, that there is no truth in the species, seems contradictory.
It begs pity.

11

generally.
That Is, art, besides reflecting life which seems to be illusory,
to be paradoxical, provides man with the opportunity of making dis
tinctions, and, classically, presumes that he can. To provide this
opportunity for choice is to supply the quality which gives the work
artistic "transcendence" beyond mere entertainment or literal imita
tion. But to provide it does not presume that asn can get entirely
beyond illusion, altogether, if only because, in itself, art can
never divorce itself from the necessity of providing illusion; that
is, of providing something other than apparent reality.
The final assumption, of course, is that reality (whatever it
is) is part-and-parcel of one's involvement in the act of realizing
life, the act of choosing, of tasking distinctions, of judging between
one arbitrary illusion and another, the act of appreciation. It is
not an absolute escape from illusion altogether. This point will be
examined more closely in Chapters II and III, but, briefly, involve
ment in mking distinctions is presumed to be note central than not
making them. 'Tell rae of what an artist is," Janes says—trying to
define the moral function of art—"and I shall express to you at once
10

his boundless freedons Mid his "moral" reference."

Or as he says

core explicitly. "The moral sense of a work of art [isj the anount
11
of felt life concerned in producing it."

10James,

The Art of the Hovel, op. cit., p. 51.

11Ibid.,

p. 49.
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"The affair of the painter is not the immediate, it is the
reflected field of life, the real® not of application, but of
appreciation [italics mine]—a truth that makes our measure of effect
altogether different."12
"Art is essentially selection, and it is selection whose main
care is to be typical, to be inclusive,"13
Jams's final stance is that of the discriminating artist, not
tliat of the purely imitative one. "Huaanity is what raw have in
comon with each other, not what they have in distinction."14 "The
essence of morality is to survey the whole field."15
Yet Janes has been criticised, and he critixed himself for not
having maintained artistic balance; he condems himself for being
too jsueh of a literalist, of dealing too nuch in the "temporal,"
of not capturing the "essences," the "depths," He implies that in
his belief that the novel is an "intense and exquisite correspondence
with life,"16 he has emphasized the word "correspondence" and has
slighted the word "immense"j in other words, that he has been too
iaitative, rather than "consolingly," "transcendent*"17 He implies
that in his desire for the novel to be "history" (since history, he

12Ibid.,

p. 57

15Ibld„

p. 25

13lbld.,

p. 20

16Ibid.,

p. 23

14Ibld»,

p. 77

I7Ibid»,

p. 151.
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says, "is also a representation of life"),*8 and in his avowal that
19
its only obligation is that it be "interesting," he has not lived
up to his ethical belief that the "essence of molality is to survey
the whole field,
Furthermore, he implies that in his concern to be a story-teller
and "capture the color of life,"20 and in his anxiousness not to
involve himself in his novel by "noralixing" or by authorial intrusions
of any sort—philosophically or otherwise—he has been almost too
diligent and has sacrificed philosophy and morality altogether*
Finally, he implies that by keeping so religiously uninvolved
in his illusion, in order not to shatter or overly influence it, and
by being so supremely (alisost too-rionically) in control of his
medium, he has failed to reflect in hiraself that sost general and
classical of human qualities upon which he himself says all art and
drama depend: titat is, the "precious human liability to fall into
traps and be bewildered."21
lite answer to the question of whether or not James thinks of
himself as aerely a historian or »rely a story teller is relevant
to what G. Mattheissen calls the "specific gravity" in James's work—
the quality that gives it balance, which nakes it more than a literal

i8Ibld.,

p. 6

20Ibid.,

p. 27.

19Ibld.,

p. 11.

21Ibid..

p. 56.
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transcription of life, sore, even, than a "history of fine consciences"
(sufficiently '•non-literal" though the words "fine consciences," al
ready argue such history to be) » ... In other words, the quality
or "essence" which gives it a "higher reality." But the more general
question about James's own personal ambiguity; that is, his apparent
refusal to become himself dominated, temporarily, by illusion (but,
instead, to remin always ironically aloof from it), at the same time
he maintains temporary involvement in illusion to be the most general
hunan condition . , • is relevant to the general human ambiguity re
garding reality mid illusion—that is, the general human bewilderment
about what true morality is, what true aestheticis® is, what true
irony (taeaningful irony) is, what true involvement is.
These distinctions will be examined briefly in the chapter to
follow. The purpose of this introduction has been to explore briefly
this important distinction between art and raw life and Jones's own
concern with this distinctions but—generally—James's work seems
anbipuous because he seems to be an aesthete about good and evil;
and in terns of estheticiss his works seem ambiguous because he seens
to be a moralist about beauty and ugliness. Instead of being morally
introspective (for instance, like Melville or Hawthorne), he is a
brooding (that is, morally introspective) esthete. His esthetic con
cern seems indistinguishable fron morality:

in him they seem to

aaaount alraost to the same thing.
Such confusion night be personally feasible: Jaaes, as a person,
is under no obligation to be consistent.

But as an artist, a classical
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artist (which is the only kind he truly admired), he is obligated
to be both entertaining and inclusive; he must provide a meaningful
illusion which is discriminating and causes his readers to be like
wise discriminating. If, however, he is confused about the moral and
aesthetic implications of his artistic illusions and does not dis
tinguish at some point between thes; if, that is, he is merely writing
out of confusion, then he loses his reactors in a labyrinth of illusion.
It is true, of course, that life itself say be an undecipherable
labyrinth of illusion which cannot be fathoaed. Janes himself implies
thiss
. . . The reason is of course that life has no direct
sense whatever for the subject and is capable, luckily
for us, of nothing but splendid waste. Hence the
opportunity for the sub lime economy of art, which
rescues, which saves, and hoards and "banks," investing
and reinvesting these fruits of toil in wondrous use
ful "works" and thus caking up for us, desperate spend
thrifts that we all naturally are, the most princely
of incomes. It is the subtle secrets of that system,
however, that are meanwhile the charming study, with
an endless attraction, above all, in the question-endlessly baffling indeed—of the method at the heart
of the madness. .. 22
In this sense, to portray that confusion, as it appears, is not
necessarily artistic falsification; it is merely literal representa
tion*
It is also true that life, portrayed in an unalloyed state of
confusion, could be presented as a very entertaining illusion for
readers not concerned with asking distinctions. James himself said
of this kind of writing!

22Ibid.,

p. 52.
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, ,. Zola "pulled it off," as we say, supremely,
in that he neve; but once found himself obliged
to quit, to our vision, his magnificent treadmill
of the pigeonholed and documented—the region we
may qualify as that of experience by imitation .. .^3
In this sense, to capture such an illusion is not necessarily artistic
falsification, either; it is merely a good story.

But if the artist

is fulfilling the classical function of art, which is to make illusion
iseaaingful, he will be neither merely a good story-teller, providing
an entertaining illusion, nor merely an historian, accurately por
traying a literally true fact of existence; his work will be a
combination of the two.
He way, as a person, in other words, as a human being, be un
concerned about the consequences of illusion; but as an artist, as
a supremely human (not super-human) entity, he must lead his deluded
readers, temporarily, out of illusion, by making some kind of
distinctions (whether moral, esthetic, ironic, romantic, misanthro
pic) between life's ambiguous contraries of good and evil, beauty and
ugliness, irony and romance, reality and illusion. It is the
artist's success or failure in being consistent at this by which h©
will be judged.
Hie artist (and Jaiaes certainly fits this category when properly
interpreted) penetrates to the "ideal" through the welter of the
"actual" and succeeds—as Irving Babbitt says: "without ceasing to
be individual"—in suggesting the universal.24 Hiat is (in Coleridge

23Ibid.,

p. 189.

24Sabbitt,

oji. cit., p. 17.
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definition of the terms, although not necessarily in Coleridge's
practice of that definition), he cotabines the illusory and the real
and tries to make (and cause to be made) distinctions between thera,
lie does not concern himself with one to the exclusion of the other.
As James himself concludes:
» . , The answer nay be after all that mysteries
here elude us, that general considerations fail
or mislead, and that even the fondest of artists
need ask no wider range titan the logic of the
particular case. The particular case, or in other
words his relation to a given subject, once the
relation .is" esi'abTisKe?,1roans' in itseIf" a little
world o# exercise and agitation. Let hia hold
himself perhaps si^remely fortunate if he can sseet
half the questions with which that air alone may
swara ...
. • • A conclusion which aeons to fall back, totally, on the "actual,"
except for the extensions beyond it gained by the artist's relation
to the fact* and except for the extensions gained froa the "logic
of the particular case"—which (it will be discovered) is the pro
pensity of the particular case for anomalous interpretation.

25

"James,

cit», p, S3.

GiAPTBR II
CI RCUMLOCUTICW J "THE METHOD AT TOE HEART OF THE MADNESS"

In discussing the artist as a character in James's fiction,
R. P. Blacksur says that an artist "cm©® to life only as he ceases
to be an artistj he cones to life, In a word, only when he fails as
an artistj awl he fails, in a word, only when the conditions of life
overcome hiia at the expense of his art."*
Blackmur here is discussing Janes's success, or lack of success,
at waking fictional artists in his stories appear to be real hurjan
beings. This is different, incidentally, frort the artist's problem
of making ordinary human beings appear to be real, because of the
artist's propensity, when dealing with fictional artists, of confusing hisself with his creations and thus shattering his illusion—
usually by making his fictional artist appear to be overly percep
tive, to seem too real, and, therefore, unbelievable as illusions.
This is also different from the problem of the artist who quite
consciously intrudes into his illusion, as himself, prodding his
illusion along with chummy pats here and there—an obvious reflection
on the reader's credulous desire for illusion, which Jaraes was seldora
guilty of perpretrating.
The second problem that of making ordinary people appear to

P. Blackaur, "In the Country of the Blue," essay in The
Question of Henry James, op. cit., p. 198.

19

be real in fiction—Jaiaes solved by never dealing too literally
with "The Real Using." In his story by that name, he catalogues
the problem of a painter who is unable to use a down-on-their luck
"real" lady and "real" gentlesan as models for a portrait fw is
doing of a "typical lady and gentlenan," because they are too real;
that is, they permit hi® no latitude for invention.

The "real

thin""--which they obviously are—intrudes too pressing ly upon
the trailseendant illusory thing he wants to create beyond their
factual literalness. To solve his problem he goes out into the
street and brings in a lower-class man and woman who can be dressed
up to appear like a lady md gentleman and thus provide hiss free
rein for invention.2
This story is relevant to the artistic problera of the artist
who is trying to make a fictional artist appear realj because such
an artist, also, if he intrudes too obviously upon his illusion by
using himself as a modal, intrudes in just the way the real lady
and gentleman do in "The Real Thing."
Actually, Jaaes seldoa intrudes in this way because, if anything,
he is too self-effacing, too unwilling to reveal hiiaself in any way
at all and thus draw to himself the penetrating glances of people

*The fact that the artist in "The Real Thing" cannot (as Walter
Clark points out in a recent essay in Chrysalis ["The Writer and the
Professor," 11(Spring, 1962), p. 60-10/^)1)0 taken seriously as an
artist is irrelevant to the general artistic problem of dealing with
reality md illusion. The artist in James's story is, quite obviously,
a romantic, and he over-emphasised the abstract possibilities of life
at the expense of the concrete; but he could still, in what Janes
calls the "crystaline" maimer (refer to discussion of this topic in
Chapter III) portray a real fact of existence and, yet, hiiaself re
main in illusion about it.
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who search out flaws in artists and assume even self-effacement to
be one of then, Self-effacetaent is actually James•s greatest
strength—and Ms cleverest ruse.3
James never lets his feet show behind those of his fictional
artist, because when he portrays an artist, the artist is portrayed
as an object of irony, and is sure to reveal his own feet of clay
in tise.

Unlike Christopher Nevnum, James's business man in The

American, who is too penetrative to be an ordinary business am, yet
not penetrative enough, either, to be Jaiaes, and therefore is not a
literal transcription of life, but m artist's invention—Janes's
artists in his stories are wore penetrating than ordinary artists,
but also not as penetrating as Janes, himself, and therefore cannot
be taken as a literal transcription of Henry James. Ihey are some*
thing less—in the sense that he is ironically removed from then,
but they are something more, too, in the sense that they are also
A ruse, incidentally, less successfully achieved by Halter Clark
in the essay just referred to, Clark—no less self-effacing,
personally, than James**'tries, in this very "Jaaesian" essay, for the
saae kind of effect—(an effect he fails to achieve, fortunately, in
his book The City of TreaMing Leaves, which is about a young artist
trapped, charmingly and naively in young illusions, who finally, like
James, comes to accept "the logic of the particular case")—except
that Clark, in this essay, is self-effacing for a very different
reason: he doesn't want—since they are obviously very painful to
him—his "critical shoes" to show. Hie virtue of this essay—other
than the penetrating light it throws on James—is that it finally
publicly reveals how well shod Clark is in this respect—and now
perhaps he can return to fiction like The Track of the Cat (his best
work), where he hides "artistic feet" antT "critical'slibesw together,
and lets only his face show through.
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artistic creations.
And, ironically, these artists achieve both stances by beinr
slightly dense. In fact, Jaraes solves most of his problems of reality
and illusion, in fiction, by making not only his artists, but also
each of his characters—even the most penetrating ones—appear to
be slightly dense. lie does this at the risk of appearing—teisnorarily—
to b© slightly dense himself. He does this because, ironically, the
reader demands that he be.4
But this facet of the Jamesian technique will be discussed later.
What is pertinent now is that Elackmur1s declaration, that a fictional
artist canes to life only when the conditions of life overcome hi® at
the expense of his art, is even sore interesting when applied to the
artist in general. In this sense, it seeras relevant to James's probless.
Applied to Jaaes, it would iaply that the conditions of true
life, fro® which Jaraes (for saany, anyway) seemed to be too far distant,
did not often enough overcome his ironic, esthetic sense (the selfeffacing James). It would iaply that if Jaraes himself (disregarding,
altogether, Jaraes'§ fictional artists) had been less in control of
his illusion, less ironic, he would have been more human, and that

^•Therefor© it is that the wary reader for the most part warns
the novelist against making his characters too intrepretative of the
muddle of fate, or in other words too divinely, too priggishly clever.
'Give us plenty of bewilderment,' this monitor seeas to say, 'so long
as there is plenty of slashing exit in bewilderment too. But don't we
beseech you, give us too mich intelligence; for intelligence—well,
endangers; endangers not perhaps the slasher himself, but the very
slashing, the subject matter of any self-respecting story..
(The Future of the Novel, op.cit., p. 56)
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the world h© portrays would be wore human, too, and, therefore, more
realistic.
The isaplication, stated differently, is that the reality Jaraes
tried to capture seems too stratified; it does not see® truly repre
sentative, as classical art demands it be*

By limiting his scope

to highly critical consciousnesses—*or, at least, to people who are
highly developed, critically and esthetically~-Jaaes's work seems
unrealistic.5
6lackwur also says that if the artist "sees," his vision
disappears in his work, which is the "Country of the Blue"--the
"Country of the Slue" being James's tern for artistic excellence—
or as he calls it, in referring to Plmubert's Madasae Bovary—
"classical dignity."6
Pursuing the line of "implication" (for whatever distance it
provides in developing a general argument), and once more applying
Blackiaur's quotes, not to James's artists, but to Jastes hiaself—this
last declaration of Blackraur's implies, indirectly, that James as a
person (as an artistic person—taking the "classical stance") nay,

5This

is no different, again, from saying that the works of
Frank Morris or Theodore Dreiser, by limiting their scope to
consciousnesses less critical—or, at least, to people vastly
underdeveloped esthetically or morally, also sees unrealistic,
because their work, while implying reality, captures only half of
it, since life is made up of both extrenes.
^One of the few worlcs of Flaubert's with which Jases had
s^all quarrel.
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himself, reach the "Country of the Blue," but that his worts say not—
the broader implication being that art is a discipline which possibly
saves Jaaes from himself, but only at the expense of his keeping his
human propensities out of his writing (those propensities by which
the world sight overcome him at the expense of his art and thus, by
Blacknur's criteria, raake him hcob»® to life"—thereby satisfying
ordinary reader's desire for sore "realistic" art).
To be wore general, still, this is like saying that a mystic
(with whose discipline James is linked less often than he should be,
since his approach to mystery is nearer this plane of reference
than is generally realized)^ way once have had a vision of ultimate
reality ("classical dignity" in James's terms), but be unwilling or
unable, to translate it adequately in terras of words or images (which,
of course, are only symbolical approximations of reality), for fear
that if he does translate it, it will be a compromise at the expense
of his personal solvency—the general implication here being that both
the work of art and the artist cannot contain the experience or
knowledge concurrently, that one or the other aust be sacrificed.
And this elaborate presupposition is all relevant, because Jams
does appear to reflise to immerse himself, for whatever greater knowledge
g
may be found there, in what Conrad has called "the destructive
7
James as a "mystic"—in method—not in vision, is discussed
briefly in the last section of this thesis.
O

And what my be found there—as Kurtz discovered—could be only
"the horror, the horror."
'
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element." Instead, he appears to hold back and create, in lieu, a

different kind of reality10 which seems to contain elements even saore
corapactly complex thai life, and paradoxes and ironies, if not nor©
profound, then more ingenious.
As Joseph Warren Beach quotes Herbert Reads "James gives a law
to life and submits it to a control ®ore severe than the discipline
[which life] herself triposes."1* In this respect he seems to be a
too-discriminatory fabulistj he demands too much.
In reply to just this sort of judgment Janes hinself once wrote
(in the preface to "the Lesson of the Master): What does this
criticism imply, "but that we have been, nationally, so to speak,
graced with no instance of recorded sensibility fine enough to react
against these things fself-deception, vulgarity, hypocrisy]*

what one

would, accordingly fain to do," Janes says, is "to create the record,
in default of any other enjoyment of it; to imagine, in a word, the
honourable, the producible core, [italics mine]
And this is what he has done. As F. R. Leavis puts it, James
has created a world in which the sost highly developed faculties of
discrimination could act* 'fie creates an ideal, civilized sensibility,
a hunanity capable of conmaiicating the finest shades of inflect!cm

§

The "destructive eleaent" concept is from Conrad's Lord Jin.

10For all its intensity and inter-windings, a "watch-spring"
kind of reality.

*\j. w• Beach, The Method of iienry James (Philadelphia: Albert
Saifer, 1954), lxxxvlii. "' ' """*
"
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and implication."

12

He scorned the average, the representational,

statistical kind of reality which was the concern of many of his
contemporaries,
In this regard, Olacknur, again, sayss
James had in his style and peifeaps in his
life which it reflected an idiosyncrasy so power
ful, so overweening, that to many it seeded a
stultifying vice, or at least an inexcusable heresy
. • • lie enjoyed an excess of intelligence and he
suffered, both in life and in art, from an excessive
effort to comraunicate it, to represent it in all
its fulness. His style grew elaborate in the degree
that he rendered shades and refinements of meaning
and feelings not usually rendered at all. .. His
intention and all his labor was to represent
dramatically intelligence at its most difficult,
its most lucid, its most beautifbl point. This is
the sua of his idiosyncrasy#
Was Janes wrong to do this? And if so, or if not, what does
it mean in terms of criticising hist?
It nesns that if he did soaehow jack up reality, putting it
on a higher plane than that froia which it is ordinarily approached,
and demanded that the reader develop his sensibility to the point
where he could enjoy art at this loftier level, then in order to
criticise hia, the reader raust find a way to judge his on his own
plane. As Janes himself says of Maupassant: "What he leaves out
has not claim to get itself considered, till after we haw done

R« Leavis, as quoted by J, W, Beach, The Question of
Henry James, op, cit., xliii,
1*
R. P. lilackmur, as quoted by Morton D. Zabel, The Question
of Henry James, op. cit., p. 21S,
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justice to what he takes in."**
8ut here is the rub, for James has declared in one of his
stories, "Hie Figure in the Carpet," that his secret, the thing
which he was most trying to communicate, will never he fathomed.
In this puzzle story, the solving of which has been the concern of
many of James's critics, James's master novelist, Vereker (whose

critics aiss the thing he has written his books "most for"), says"
Isn't there for every writer a particular
thing of that sort, the tiling that most makes
hin apply himself, the thing without the effort
to achieve which he wouldn't write at all| the
veiy passion of his passion, the part of the
business in which, for hio, the flame of art bums
most intensely? , » . There's an idea in my work
without which I wouldn't give a straw for the
whole job. It's the finest, fullest intention of
the whole lot, and the application of it has been,
I think, a triumph of patience and ingenuity, ,.
It stretehes, this little trick of mine, froa
book to book. The order, the form, the texture of
•y books will perhaps someday constitute for the
uninitiated a complete reproduction of it.. •
so it is naturally the thing for the critic to
look for... It strikes me,. * even as the thing
for the critic to find.
This trick, or "exquisite theme," as Vereker calls it, we can
be sure, is the same thing as Jaaes's "Figure in the Carpet," the
"Turn of the Screw," the "Beast in the Jungle." This is the thing
about James's works which »ystifies readers. And when put into
practice James's trick is^the cause of what critics consider to be
the ambiguity and moral confusion of his later works.
This "Figure in the Carpet" has been variously defined: Vereker

**The Future of the Novel, op, cit., p, 202
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warns his critics that it is not a kind of esoteric message; and
he will not liait it by saying it is something in the style or
soesething in the thought—an element of for® or an elenient of
feeling; but ha does says "What I contend that nobody has ever
raentioned In say work is the organ of life."
Actually, this secret of James is so simple that the reader
would feel cheated, if James told him what it was, simply. Conrad aost
certainly knew what the secret was, for he, too, employed it in
all of his works; although, as James might have said: "Conrad does
not reveal it in the style, but he captures it in the style." The
"figure in the carpet" is sisply the fact that reality seems to be
paradoxical} that, therefore, in order to capture reality, art nust
likewise see® to be paradoxical. Or, to put it another way: every
artist sets out to define reality as he sees it, and all artists
have as their goal the development of sensibility; every artist
assumes from the beginning that his reader is temporarily innocent
of his particular view of truth, or reality—or, otherwise, why
would he try to consunicate it?
Eut to cormunicate it is to make the innocent aware; it is to
corrupt hin, to destroy his innocence. This is the paradox of life
and of art, and it is Henry James*® only thente. The world is truly
a vicious round in which the innocent seek the knowledge of the
non-innocent, and then, when (or if) they are corrupted (that is,
if they do not retreat fro® this knowledge in time), then feed on
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the unawareness of the innocent. This is the truth which James
communicates; but it does not explain the means by which he himself
manages to escape this vicious circle} for Jaaes—like no other
writer other titan Joseph Conrad—insists upon himself remaining
innocent—upon himself being neither corrupt, nor a corrupter, upon
remaining, that is, uninvolved.
The loophole by which Janes apparently thinks he escapes this
vicious circle is his trick; his technique of circumlocution being
the first key. James's truth that truth is paradoxical and illusory
is so siiaple that it had to be circumlocuted to sees like any truth
at all.
A writer like Janes tsust sometimes circualocute the truth he
is trying to portray just so that, in prose, it will not seem a
cliche which the reader will think he already knows. The writer
must sosae times recast un old truth in a new mold, so that what seems
old will evoke the original response which the truth would evoke
in any guise, if the guise itself were not so often false and un
original. The writer isust proceed by indirection.
A work of James's which illustrates the necessity of this
technique more than others is the story, "The Beast in the Jungle,"
a work which depends entirely upon circumlocution and indireetion to
communicate a simple idea which Jaaes might have revealed in a few
lines, if he had really thought the idea could be so easily revealed.
The story is of a nan, John Marcher (the na»e evokes his

29

action), who spends all of his lifetime waiting expectantly for
something vitally remarkable to happen to him, sure, at every
aoiaent, that something eventually will, since he has always sensed
that he is being "kept" for a fate "rare and strange, possibly
prodigious and terrible." He involves in his expectant waiting a
woraan-fricnd, May iiartra», who, unbeknownst to his, loves him, and
mo also lives for his strange fate to resolve itself.
As it turns out, the remarkable thing that happens to John
Marcher, finally, is the fact that nothing does—except for his
remarkable involvement in expectation, lie does not even have the
realization (in time for him to do anything about it, anyway) that
his remarkable fate night have been to fall in love with expectantly
waiting. May Sartram. For she, weanwhile, has died, after realizing,
without telling Marcher so, that the strange fate that is to be his
is never to shatter, in tine, the reaarkable paradox of his ambiguous
expectation.
If Jaaes had revealed the idea of this story in one line, the
reader would have thought it too simple. Even as it is, his tendency
is to pause, and say: "But, of course 1" Or: "But that's nothing
remarkableI" And he tends to look askance and wonder if he hasn't
been made a fool of. To which James would have no recourse, but to
retort, sadly, like T. S. Eliot's Prufrocks "That is not what I
meant at all; that is not it at all ..
Because such a dreary response to paradox is not what Jaiaos
meant!
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Hie paradoxical, "trick" idea of the story is secondary to
what Janes calls "the method at the heart of the madness"—the
nethod at the heart of the sadness being the "organ of life," which
James aanages to reflect by being able to embody a paradoxical idea
in its own ambiguous substance, so much so that when the truth of
the story is finally revealed for what it is, the reader is sur
prised, not by the idea of paradox, which is not that remarkable,
but by his substantiated involvement in paradox.

The reader and

Marcher thread their way through James's labyrinth together, arriv
ing, after a duel predicament and after a duel kind of expectation
at alnost a duel kind of realization—the realization that (despite
anticipation) nothing remarkable has happened, except a reraarkahle
involvement in anticipation.
Janes has merely presented a vehicle, a paradoxical labyrinth
for a mind to enter and depart from. What we have here is the
mystery-detective story broadened and deepened to its fullest capacity,
and then something besides.
Obviously what James tried to do (but not do obviously) was
to reawaken dulled and corrupted sensibilities to fresh responses
again. That a man who has been condemned for his cold and overlycontrolled approach to life should have spent his lifetime proving
the religious maxim that "lest you become as a child again, you
will in no-wise re-enter heaven," is a paradox in itself. Janes
plays the part of an innocent child, leading the reader through
mysterious corridors and seemingly endless labyrinths, all for the

31

apparently naive purpose of springing forth suddenly with a truth
which seems new only because it is old. There is always the
response afterwards of: "But I already knew that!" Yet Jaaes will
take this risk in order to open, or revitalize, deadened pores of
perception. And he does it by the method of conscious indirection
which gives an effect of new reality.
Unconsciously indirect writing, on the otter hand—which we
see in ®any of James's imitators—is often false and unoriginal
because it does not peel away the issues which would penait the
reader to face truth consciously; or, at least, to face the fact
that he cannot know the truth. Indirection, like conscious ambiguity
(as vlanres always employs it), should not be born of confusion. Ford
Madox Ford, who bases his claim for Janes's greatness on James's
gift as an historian, seeiss to display such confusion (about Jaaes's
attitude towards circumlocution, if not about the use of the
technique itself), when he says of Joaes:
I fancy that his mannerisms, his involution,
whether in speech or in writing were due to a
settled conviction that [he would never] find any
one who would not need talking down to. The
desire of the artist ... is that his words and
his scenes shall 'suggest* far more than they
actually express or project."
Ford addss

"So he talked down to us ... lie was aininp at

explicitness, never obscurities, as if he were talking to children,"

iSFord Madox Ford, "Hie Old Man," essay in The Question of
Henry Jaaes, op. cit., p. SI.
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This statement, though very close, is still far off: it seetns
to reveal unawareness of Jasaes's very conscious techniquo; for, if
anything, Jases expected far store of his reader, not less. Jases
didn't write down. Ford seems not to realize that the truth James
was illustrating is really quite staple, bat it could not be
coraaunicated simply; and Jawes was not conftised about it. To express
it Janes had to be indirect and, apparently obtuse, just because it
was so simple. Jaaes didn't doubt the discerning reader's ability
to understand his truth, only the reader's willingness to admit,
from the beginning, that he has temporarily forgotten it, and is in
need of being reminded of what it is again.
My adopting the method of conscious indirection Henry Janes,
as a philosopher, is saying that truth is illusory; or, as T. 5.
Eliot has Prufrock say its

"It is a matter of decision and revi»

sion." A aind that refuses to accept surface oeanings will always
try to overturn the upper surface to see what lies beneath.

A mind

which embraces paradox insists that there is no surface which will
defy this turning. It insists that every first impression is mi
illusion. The world for such a mind is like two mirrors facing each
other which reflect one another endlessly, except that the aind does
not immediately see the entire succession of images. It does not
see (as the mystic, for instance, maintains that he sees) how the
infinite reflections of fact and symbol resolve themselves into a
harmonious whole, an order that has meaning because everything in
that order is equally significant. The mind which embraces paradox
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moves fro® cm© image to another, examines it and then goes on to the
next. Such a pursuit is paradoxical in itself, since it searches
for meanin« with the presumption that meanings can never be found.
It resigns to a paradoxical approach to life, and it decides that
this image-breaking (or symbol-dissolving, since that is what images
are: symbols of a manifestly incomprehensible reality) is the only
\

meaningful pursuit there is.
This, essentially, is tho kind of reality Janes wirrors (but
not which he necessarily becomes involved in)—conscious indirection
and ambiguity being his particular way of translating it into litera
ture.
The danger of this approach, of course, is that ambiguity and
paradox are the language of irony, and irony-for-its-own-sake can
be self-ccmsuaing and destructive of any meaning which it ostensibly
intends to convey. It can end up taking nothing seriously, not even
irony. It can beeosse, in other words, what Irving Babbitt (in his
book Rousseau and Romanticism) has called"a pilgrioage in a void,"
Previously, Babbitt was quoted as saying that one of the most
delicate tasks is to determine whether a paradox occupies a position
111
sore or less central than the convention to which it is opposed, . ,

lit

Ambiguity and paradox are also the language of the mystic,
but he uses thens in a quite different manner—as a compromise, a
concession, to the demands of conventional reality; they are
necessary to translate his vision into terms which can be understood,
ilis vision, he o&intains, is beyond either paradox or ambiguity.
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. . . and that a soaewhat similar probleia i s to
determine which of two conventions has the greater
degree of centrality: for one convention may,_as
compared to another sees highly paradoxical.
And Schlegel says that romantic irony is identical with paradox,
aabbitt is discussing here the complacency, almost fervor, with which
the ronantic ironist (the Laforguian ironist, as Babbitt, ami Ivor
Winters and Leslie Fiedler refer to him) is affilming the inevit
ability of such an acceptance.
James hiaself is not a romantic ironist—if oily because he
takes himself and his art too seriously (The romantic-ironist, by
definition, is often morbidly sensitive about hinself, but is
always ready to mock at his own convictions)--hut James's brother,
William, did notice the existence of a "void-like" irony-for-itsown-sake attitude in James*s work, when he says that Janes*s
characters see» constructed "wholly of prismatic interferences of
light, ingeniously focused by mirrors upon empty space,*®
This is the way the characters in many of James*s works do
appear to be formed, and it accounts for the almost excessive
ambiguity and the passionate curiosity, as well as for the apparent
moral confusion, of some of his characters.
Not only the external world seems to be "void-like," in this

1^Babbitt,

eg. cit,

*®Andre Gide (from a letter to Charles Du Boi), The Question of
nenry James, op, cit,, p. 251.
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way, but also the people do, the characters themselves do, every
thing does. As Andre Gide said: "James's characters never live
except in relation to each other.

And Gide stabs vitally close to

what may be James's personal secret when he said that James "had no
mystery in hi®, no secret, no 'Figure in the Qrpet' . . . a s i f h e ,
20

hiaself, had perhaps nothing to confess."

Hiis appears to be true. It is the paradox of James, the person.
In spite of his intense curiosity, his almost Morbid manner of hover
ing about in the presence of aystery, he finally seems to indicate
that there is no mystery at all in life, unless it is created.

Reality has no substance for him. Reality is an image in the mirror;
it exists only in the minds of people.
Van Wyck Brooks said:
Jaaes presented characters merely in the act of
discovering one another [whose] ruling passion
was curiosity. They tried to discover what went
cm in cane another's sand and remained in the end
as mystified as they were in the beginning ...
Everyone watched in Jaaes's novels, watched him
self, watched the others, 'nosed about' for re
lations, sniffed and pried, and the people were
without consistence • • • they spun webs about
themselves, and in fact they were ghosts without
interests, or attributes, without passions,
hearts or vitals; and they drifted about in a
curious limbo as insubstantial as themselves.
Brooks here, however, does not see® to realize how vulnerable he

19Ibid..
21Van

p. 251.

2aIbid.,

Wyck Crooks, oj?. cit., p. 404.

p. 252.
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is in his apparent invulnerability,22

does he seem to want to

give Janes credit for controlled irony. James only portrayed the world
as he saw it. His irony is his realization (and the display of
that realization in his works) that this avid curiosity, which is
so much a part of his characters, is nowhere mirrored more accurately
than in the minds of his readers. For it is just this curiosity on
the part of the reader that permits the author to draw the reader
through the story.
Jaaes's drama takes place largely in the winds of his characters,
but he makes the reader erne of those characters. The characters and
the reader are trying to thrust through illusion, and thus seem to
be conducting the narrative as they do so. Jaaes presents his people
almost without editorial comment; the characters and the reader sake
all the conclusions that are to be made; and the reader cannot be
sure what Jaaes himself really thinks, until he stands before hin
at the conclusion of the story. And he sometimes can't tell even then.
Jams lets the characters in his novels see the abyss that is
between what they know and what they don't know, what they learn
and what they never learn about one another. Hie realtor's degree
of enlightensent (always limited, even at the conclusion) is always
just greater than that possessed by the characters in the story.
^Jm»s believed that the common denominator of behavior,
which make3 mm raost human, is his tendency to fall into traps and
be bewildered: nt'f fc have called the nost general state of one's
most exposed and assaulted figures the state of bewildement. . .it
is rather witless to talk of getting rid of that. .. highlyrecommended . » , categories of feeling ...(Preface to The Princess
Casaraissiiaa)
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James penalts the reader then to grasp the immediate significance
of the difference between what he knows and *Aat the character
doesn't, but never so much that the reader will lose interest.
Nothing is explained, hence the drama. This technique literally
draw the reader within the story. As. R. P. Rlacteur says: "Hie
secret of perception in the readers becomes very near the secret of
23

creation in artists."

None of James's stories so effectively illustrate his technique
of indirection and circumlocution and the ambiguous depths through
which an interpretive saind must delve in order to fathom the ironies
and paradoxes possible with this technique than his story, "The
Turn of the Screw,"
The central problem in interpieting this story—as it is in
most of Jaraes's stories—is to determine which of the characters is
seeing things as "they really are." When the reader has finished
the story, he still can't be sure which character sees absolute
truth; but if he has been diligent in always overturning the upper
surface, he can finally disprove the veracity of at least sowe of
the characters, and thus arrive closer to James's particular truth,
and aaybe even truth as it is generally seen. The story is partic
ularly treacherous, hoover; because the reader becomes so involved,
finally, if he becmss involved at all, that James's final turn of

23Blacknur,

The Question of Henry James, op. cit., p. 215.
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the screw may very well be at his expense.
For nore than anything, "Us® Turn of the Screw" is a story
about assumptions. It is a study of the lengths to which a delving
Bind

will go to interpret—falsely, if it wist—conditions and

events which ©re not, literally, as the mind desires thee to be.
Such a mind starts confusing its own desires for reality. Such a
Blind begins to aisiuteipret the "literal" facts*

It begins to

misrepresent the "particulars" which are, themselves, anomalous.

CHAPTER III
THE ANOMALOUS PARTICULAR CASE
Careless readers of "The Turn of the Screw" assume that this is
a story about a governess's valiant attempts to keep two apparently
innocent children fron the corrupting influence of two malevolent
ghosts. More careful readers (viz, Edmund Wilson) have corrected
this initial assumption, and have discovered that the story is
actually an ambiguous tale which can be read in contrary ways. One
way, as just indicated, is to assume the innocence of the guardian,
to discover, subsequently, the corruption of the apparently innocent
children.
The other interpretation, sore accurate, is to reverse this view
and recognize the governess as the corrupting influence. The latter
approach, which takes into consideration the story's ambiguity, is
certainly much eloser to the facts of the storyj but this interpreta
tion, if it rests only at general a»biguity (unconscious ambiguity),
as Edward Wilson's reading seems to do, is also misleading, because
it does not give Jantes•s full credit for conscious irony, for what
ever distance is implied by such ironyj and because it implies that
there is no transcendent meaning to the aabiguous presentation. Un
conscious ambiguity leaves one in illusion, instead of bringing one,
temporarily, out of illusion; and it does not cause one to realise
that involvement in illusion is sometimes the only reality there is.
Involvement in illusion, the attempt to interpret it, can create
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a new kind of reality, but it can also create illusion, too. Mo
illusion develops, unless the Bind interprets particulars mysteriously,
unless it extends to cold, hard actuality, soeie mystical quality.
Reality, Jases would say, is not just the fact or the object, or even
the "psychological picture" by which one gives the fact visual em
bodiment; reality is also a person's involvement or lack of involveaent with the fact. If he does not become involved, he is mysterious
in his lack of involvement.
That is, reality is also the personal extensions of the cold,
hard, "crystaline" detail—the generalities a person makes or does
not sake about them. This act of discrimination, or failure to
discriminate, is what constitutes reality. This is the "real thing,"
the "beast in the jungle,""the jolly corner," the "figure in the
carpet," the "turn of tlie screw," the holy or unholy labyrinth.
Wiat delusion consists of, James implies, is a person's refusal
to recognize the part played by his involveaent or lack of involvement
in illusion—the influence it has on his personal make-up, his
personal "picture." It is just the refusal of this recognition,
•lams would say, which permits a person (like the governess in "Hie
Turn of the Screw," for instance) to become so involved in literary
illusion, in the first place.1 He can fool himself into thinking he
is getting experience, the facts, but is not, thereby, personally
affected by them. S!e can have his cake and eat it, too} or, as the

*The governess, of cour$@« does not herself become involved in
literary illusion, but in the illusions which come from misrepre
sentingconcrete "particulars."
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case Bay be, he can take his poison and yet not take it, either.
He cart live vicariously, share doubtful knowledge or overwhelming
experience, and yet fool himself into thinking he is not really a
part of it, lie can presume to innocence or ignorance, at the same
time that he is losing it. He can feel insulated and inviolable,
because of the multitudinous screens of illusion and delusion which
aii ingenious artist like James raises between him and the cold fact.
And what protects the reader, Jases would say—the innocence which
permits hin to play this diabolical gase and yet, despite involve*
merit, maintain his moral and intellectual solvency, is his naive
belief that the fictional fact is not real—when, James would insist,
it is as real or more real than life itself, which has no aeaning
at all until it is strained through a person's consciousness. He
says, in other words, that this relationship to the fact or illusion
is reality. "Tell me of what the artist or reader or character is
conscious," James says, "and I will tell you what he is." He night
as well have said: "Tell ne what he is, and X will tell you what he
sees."
If the careful reader sticks close to the text of "The Turn of
the Screw" (and this is, except for the rebounding critical opinion,
all he has to go cm, except for one or two illuminating com@nts about
the story by James},2 he will see that this particular illusion is
ambiguous, not because the reader cannot determine who is genuine—
the children or the governess. (There is actually nothing ambiguous
2
These comments to be brought forth later.
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about Jases's attitude towards her.) Evidence is readily available
of how sho perverts truth for her own motives (and thoy my, as
Edmund Wilson indicates, be Freudian actives) .. , The apparent
contradiction in the story is that this "reporter," who distorts
reality, is also, as Janes says, "the authority." The governess
(she who is the one most in illusion) is also the "governor" of the
"literary" illusion. She holds "crystaline" in her consciousness
"her record of so many anomalies said obscurities" in the life around
her*

That is, she perfectly and impartially reflects all of the

facts to the reader; but in her involvement with the facts, her
explanation of the facts, she tends to Misrepresent each of them.5
Therefore, the reader himself aust carefully delve beneath her mis
representations to unearth the truth which exists, despite her mis
representation, within the "crystaline" view. As Jases says, we
need not accept the governess's explanation of the anomalies, for
that is "a different matter.^
The final interpretation is left to the reader's discretion—and
this is fortunate or unfortunate, according to the reader's tempera
ment—and potentially ironical, too, in the end, because it can lead
the reader into the sarae illusions the gov©mess faces, and also

3The

governess, in other words, imitates the facts perfectly,
in nuch the same way, the naturalists, for instance, imitate life;
but then she distorts them,
*!!cnry Jaaes, as quoted in "Henry James to the Ruminant Reader:
Hie Turn of the Screw." fay Edna Kenton. A Casebook on Henry Jams's
TKeT^^tKe Served.) Gerald Nillen (Mew Vorkr^SSas Y. <Wll
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provide hiss th© saw® opportunities for aisrepresentation. But if
tit® reader is truly discriminating he can, at least, @liaiaate th®
governess as an accurate reporter of experience.
This last point needs careful documentation because, despite
th© critical attention this work has received, it is a fact not
enough emphasi2®d. Also the clear light the story casts upon mm*n
<reneral ititlimttion to fall into and out of illus-iea, because either
he m reality is ambiguous or paradoxical, is also pertinent to the
thesis at hand. Edaund Wilson, for instance, recognizes the mbipwity of the sfwemess's response to Illusion, and he catalogues
his £i»diitg»| but he concludes that this reading is only one of th#
possible interpretations regarding her. He i»j»liea that Jamas, not
necessarily th# pjoveraess, is obscure*, and that ho is obscure purely
for the sake of romance, for the sake of illusion.
fin th© contrary, there is nothing obscure about th® governess's
assumptions; she quit# obviously distorts reality; and although James
is ambiguous, he is not ambiguous purely for the sake of illusion*
for romance. He is purposely ambiguous for the sake of iavolyeaent,
for the act of discrimination such a presentation forces in the
consciousness of the critical reader; in other words, for the "higher
reality** such a presentation achieves by not presuming to be real,
yet by presenting at the same time, a real condition of humanity—
that is span's tendency to fall into traps and he bewildered.
*

*

*
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The governess in "The Turn of the Screw" is a wmm dreadfully
liable to impression, who atlraits that she is "easily carried away."
"I

mm carried away in London," she tells Mrs. Grose, the house-

keeper, referring to her infatuation with her male employer-~an
infatuation whicft influences many of her acts and decisions, Sent
to Ely, an isolated estate, where she finds herself "strangely" at the
hela," in "suprerae authority," sent there to educate the young niece
of her ©a^loyer, she is jbuaediatftljr suspicious. At once, she suspects
that the housekeeper, Mr*#- Grese# is on her guard about greeting her
fully,

although actually the governess*s first reaction is pleasure

at being greeted so volubly. In a typical way she has of presenting
the true detail, and then distorting that detail, she says: "I
perceived within half an hour that she was so glad * , * as to be
positively on her guard against showing it too such*

I wondered even

then * , * why she would wish- not to show it, and that* with r»«
flection, with suspicion, aight of coirse have

me uneasy,"5

IMs quote shows how Janes gives the reader a "crystaline" view
of events at Mly by working through the wind of a person whom the
reader, eventually, has all the reason to raistrust. One such insight
isakes her seen reasonable and self-aware, but as such impressions
multiply, the sensitivity of the governess becomes suspect*

we begin

to suspect her of being overly acute.

C

Quotes £r« The Turn of the Screw from A Casebook en Henry
James's pirn of the Screw,, op. jl"t»t which includes a prxitting of
'tKe e«pTef@ TtoryT
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This first "turn of the screw" is particularly ironical, too,
because for the reader to be so acute as to begin to suspect the
governess of being overly acute is very similar to the governess's
beginning to suspect the housekeeper, Mrs* Grose, of being the sane.
the governess's fears are evaporated when she meets Flora, the
niece, who is "beatific" and "angelic," although these adjectives
spur the reader into making soma aore assumptions of his own. One
sore twist of the screw, now, makes hi# suspect Floral

another twist,

later, will make hia suspect, even aore, the woman who uses such
adjectives,
the governess looks forward to her duty, which is to "watch,
teach, form"6 the child, and she arranges that she should have Flora
"as a matter of course at night." She feels that one of her duties
is to "contrive to win the child into a sense of knowing" her.
On discovering that little Miles, the nephew of her employer,
has "dismissed his school"—an event always open to suspicion be
cause the contents of the letter from the school are never divulged,
and, as Mrs, Grose later explains, "no particulars given"—the
governess tells Mrs. Grose that Miles "is an injury to the others,"
and "to aeet [her] friend the better," she "offers up on the spot"
the sarcastic reply that Miles is an injury to "his innocent mates,"
an ironic twist at the expense of Miles*s schoolmates (an assumption

6In

its innocent sense, "to watch, teach, form" is also the
duty of the classicist.
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that Mrs. Grose appreciates "seating" another nind as suspicious
as her mm) that the governess will later use in reference to her
own pupils.
The governess "fancies" that Mrs. Grose seeks to avoid her.
She involves Mrs. Grose in talk about Miles, and she wonders aloud
if he mightn't be a "contaminating" influence. In response to this
conjecture, Mrs, Grose laughs "oddly"! "Are you afraid he*11
corrupt youT* she says, a question which gives the governess "an
apprehension of ridicule."
Her "apprehension", of course, could be correct,

but she does

not try to find out on what grounds it is correct; that is, whether
or

not the "ridicule" is justified.
The following day the governess enquires about the forser

governess, discovers that she was pretty, and says?
like

""He seeas to

us young and pretty"—referring, probably, to her eraployer,

but, possibly, to Miles.

Mrs. Grose replies:

use of the past tense which is

a

glossed over by Mrs. Grose, and which

breeds the first suspicion in the governess's
possibly,

"Oh, he did,"

siind that there was

at one time, another male or female at Bly.

Hiles cones down to Bly, already under "an interdict," as the
governess phrases it, and, like Flora, he is all innocence with a
"fragrance of purity," "divine," "incredibly beautiful."
to do

She decides

nothing at present about the school letter concerning his
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"dismissal," and, when she tells Mrs. Grose of this decision, she

immediately assumes that Mrs, Grose1s flicking of her apron and her
opening comment: "Miss, if I may use the freedosa , ,

are an

overture to kissing her, which she permits—fee ling then that she
and Mrs, Grose are at one. Actually Mrs, Grose's flicking of her
apron could be an overture to giving a hesitant reprimand or merely
refusing to become involved in the Governess's assumptions.
•

*

*

To digress a noment: here—in just the "flicking of an apron"
by a housekeeper, an action which is construed by another person
as an overture to "oneness," as the forming of a "pact" of sorts,
we have a"crystaline, anomalous, particular ease," which as James
would say is "adorably pictoral." Hie action is simple enough,
yet it is so simple that various interpretations can be put upon
it.
To Jaiaes's unique consciousness, "particulars"—physical,
psychological,
"adorably

objective, subjective, ruminative entities—are all

pictoral,"8

since they can be strained through the picture-

receiving consciousness's of his "reporters," and can even be
distorted by thm in their own minds, Sut in themselves the

7
The actual word is "dismissed"; "he has dismissed his school"—
which leaves it open to two interpretations; either M'ies did the
"dismissing" or he was "diSBissed," We can't know which.
8Ja®es, "Hie Art of Fiction," Hie Future of the Novel, op. cit.,
p. 23.
—.
——
•
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"particulars" are anomalous in their ambiguity; they perversely deny,
in themselves, to be anything more than "adorably pictoral." If
they are misleading, the v.isrepresentation reflects only the mis
leading Binds of those who interpret them. The particulars themselves
are all ambiguous anomalies.
According to this logic, even a human being, a Jamesian "reporter,"
can be a "crystaline, anomalous, particular case." It is possible for
the Jasesiait reporter to hold "crystaline" in his consciousness "the
record of the many anomalies and obscurities of life arowtd him";
he can, in other words, act as a "common denominator" of experience
and

mirror exactly what he sees, and yet still reflect back

associations which are innacurate,

simply because of the anomaly

of the particular case; that is, the propensity for ambiguous in
terpretation always inherent in every fact—whether the fact be a
psychological "picture," emanating frosa a physical object (the way a
wonan stands thus and gracefully lays her gloves upon a table),
whether it is a person, or whether it is a concrete object.
For Jaiaes the particular case is always the general case, too;
it is at every taoaent the nicrocosra and the macrocosm; it is, at
every aoraent, like a Chinese puzzle, a set of interfittin.y Japanese
tables,

a conbination of reflecting mirrors—all of which could be

infinite

in their potential combinations and intervorkings, if the

artist could (or

wanted to) wake thea so.

Eut this magical power

of the particular case is temporarily shattered when a "reporter*s
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Q
consciousness begins working on it.
The

"reporter*®" consciousness, in other words, reacts innately

to the remarkable ambiguity of the particular case by either culling
fro® it meanings which are, in some cases, absolutely unique (unique,
that is, in being a "common denominator" of experience); or, in other
cases by taking fros it meanings which are absolutely peculiar
(peculiar, that is, in not being any longer a "coramon denominator"
of experience. Or else the "reporter's" consciousness robs the
particular of any extensions beyond itself at all, and remains flatly
imitative.
Thus, it is not the experience of misrepresenting or isae.nifyinr
or underestimating a fact which is uncosaaon (the general condition
of humanity, James says, is to "fall into traps and be bewildered).
It is the "reporter*s" reaction to that very coaaon experience of
becoming involved with and shattering the ambiguity of the anomalous
particular case which is potentially explosive.*®

By temporarily

a

Hie classicist—who insists upon refracting some meaning frora
particulars, if only the act of creating seaning from the®, would
look upon the temporary shattering as good and necessary, in order
to gain soae higher meaning. The story teller, the romantic, would
also look upon it as fortunate and necessary, in order, as Jases
says of romance, to "cut the stxkig" on the "real" properties of the
particular case. The historian, who insists upon aerely reflecting,
imitating particulars, and insists upon letting the particulars
speak entirely for themselves, would call this temporary shattering
of "reality," and the subsequent "romanticizing" of the fact, bad.
10

One can't help associating the "particular case," in this
sense, with the temporarily "shattered" atom, and man's reaction to
that act.
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shattering its inherent ambiguity, th® reader makes it temporarily
something

unique for himself (which is all a classicist would ask);

but if, in the process of reacting to his unique experience, the
"reporter*1 makes the case so supremely peculiar to himself that it
no longer shares bed-or-board with general experience,1* then it is
no longer humanly relevant, and it is not only paradoxical, but
distructive

of any meaning which it ostensibly seeks to convey,

If this discussion seems to be irrelevant to any pursuit except
the classical (which priaarily maintains an interest in meaning), it
is

very relevant to that pursuit; because the unique attitude of the

classicist is that he isust innately suspect (though aay use) a
peculiar, an eccentric experience. "Humanity," he says (as before
quoted), "is what uen have in common with each other, and not what
they have in distinction," "Art is selection, and it is selection
whose aain care is to be typical, to be inclusive." "The essence
of moral

energy is to survey the whole field."

This

demand on the particular case to remain "crystaline" (that

is, to reflect accurately the "anomalies and obscurities of life"),
yet be, at the same time, a unique reflection of life—whether the
particular

case is an objective fact, or a "picture" of a person

11
"This discussion, though admittedly very abstract, at this
point in the thesis, is pertinent not only to the classical stance,
but to the "mystic" stance as well, which will be discussed briefly,
as it applies to Jaraes, in the last section of the thesis.
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looking at m objective fact*2 this demand tends, because of the
various interpretations of it which are possible, to extend life's
reflections, life's "pictures" indefinitely, so that in James's
style (quoting Slaeksur's description again —which is itself a
reproduction of this plasticity of life in general): "The secret
of perception in the reader cones very near the secret of creation
in the artist."
This is probably why James refers to the novel as "history":
"As the picture is reality," he says, "so the novel is history"*^
an apparent confusion of terms which aakes us want to ask of James:
"if the

novel is history, then what is history?—until we realize

that, to Jesses, history undoubtably resembles fiction, because it
more visibly, aore "pictorally," partakes of the general hUBsan
condition—which is the liability to fall into

traps and be be

wildered." History adhers to the particulars; it doesn't usually
presuae to take in the whole picture at once but plods along,
apparently fully occupied, at each moment, in the mystique of each

12

Hie governess in "Hie Turn of the Screw"—she who "governs"
the illusions in this story—is all three: an objective fact, a
"crystalin© consciousness," and also a "picture" (Jams's illusion)
of someone looking at objective facts; arid, therefore, is herself
an "anomalous particular case."

13
The Future of the Novel, op, cite» p. 5.
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fact.14
Such

fact-for-fact,

"chronicled" history, however, is not art,

James would say, until a creative consciousness
views it objectively; and then strains it
through a sensitising,

fact-for-fact,

back

stands

back and

into literature

"picturizing" hunan conscious

ness (which saay or say not be objective)--leaving it, still, the
fluid, anomalous, complex

tiling

life

appears already

to be—yet, in

14
In itself, of course, there is nothing indefensible about
looking at on® tiling at a time. The. mystic, for instance, who
assiases that he gets beyond even irony and paradox (though he must
use paradox to translate his vision), always looks at one thing at
a tiiae, absorbed totally in the raystery of each. But he expects
(unlike the supreme ironist) to find s one thing of absolute value
thereby, tie professes to having hnd a realization that everything
whcih exists is always, at every ncnent, soaehow a part of everything
else. To the cystic nothing is rcore significant than anything else,
and yet, conversely, nothing is less significant than anything else,
either.
This equation is not even, necessarily, an affirmation, but
simply a statement of fact* If me desires to examine the idea,
it can wean (as Ingmar Berpian develops it in his movie "Through
a Glass Darkly") that God is a Spider—and mean, thereby, nothing
necessarily derogatory to the spider, or to the concept of God,
either, for that matter. Hie significance of the idea depends upon
the peculiar or general way a human being has of looking at a fact.
If such a comparison tens to nudge one into a state of madness (as
it does the young girl in Bergman*s movie), this is possibly because
one gives the spider, or the concept of God, more significance,
mere "presence," more "reality," than one should*

The matter-of-fact anomalous "logic" of this "r.ystic's" equation
is that "nothinjr is sore significant than anything else, yet nothing
is less significant than anything else, cither. This is a cosnsieally
democratic idea which is not likely to catch on generally—or at
least until the human consciousness stops magnifying things ("parti
culars") out of perspective with one another. It's an idea which
James himself, who is hardly democratic, would probably look at
askance, had he been interested in "ideas."
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the meantime, Baking a cos;isaent on life and involving the reader hi*IS
self in a conscious or unconscious cos«*ent on life, too. That is,
discriminating, classical art "human.iass," in the foro of fiction,
"hi story" or "life" which lias "no direct sense whatever for the
subject," and refracts it into the stuff of a greater complexity.
Jane:# view of life was, thus, one of costalc fluidity, a continuous
organic transformation sad re transformation, in which the artist played

But as T, S, Eliot said of Jataes*$ "baffling" escape frorc this
sphere of interests "James had a mind so fine that no idea could
violate it," Jaaes was interested in the seans of capturing life most
fully, not in the ends. If anything, he doubted Ms breadth of (though
not his passion for)' Idctail. lie evidently felt he had never fully
explored the full possibilities of "the particular case." He admires
Balzac most, for example, for having almost lost himself in a
labyrinth of detail (an envy which would seen' contrary to his
suspicion of the naturalistic writers, like Sola, who do lost them
selves, except that Jams would say that Balzac wore $TTly realized
1
the:.! artistically). Jaaxs says of Balzac:
... Cur passages are mainly short and dark .. . we
soon cose to the end of the??!—dead walls, dead walls,
without resonance, in presence of which the candle goes
out and the gam stops, and we have only to retrace our
steps. Balzac*s luxury, as I call it, was in the
extraordinary number and length of his radiating and
ramifying corridors—the labyrinth in which he finally
lost hissefl ...It is a question, you see, of penetrat
ing into a sbject; his corridors always went further and
further; which is but another way of expressing his
inordinate passion for detail ... (from the Lesson on
Balzac)
IS
"Conscious or unconscious" according to their temperament and
habits of discrimination.
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a role, not only of Moderator, but of c r e a t o r . T o borrow Leon
iidel's phrase: the artist is one "who gives a permanent and endur
ing shape to a life which is evanescent and perishable."*'' Or, as
Jams himself says in the preface to The Spoils of Ponyton;
... lif© being all inclusion and confusion,
and art being all discrimination and selection,
the latter, in search of the hard latent value,
with which alone it is concerned, sniffs around
the mass as instinctively and unerringly as a
dog suspicious of sosae buried bone. The dif
ference here, however, is that while the dog
desires his bone but to destroy it, the artist
finds in his tiny nugget, washed free of awkward
accretions and hararaered into a sacred hardness,
the very stuff for a clean affinaation, the
happiest chance for the indestructible.*8
The artist can refine his "tiny nugget" of value, of meaning,
from the awkward accretions of life, but he does not, thereby,
necessarily know life, or shatter its ambiguous laysteryj he simply
holds the "happiest chance for the indestructible."
Thus,he is always involved in the question—"endlessly baffling
indeed—of the raethod at the heart of the sadness"*

that is, where

to find these affiraative "nuggets" and how to recognize thea when they
are found. And, as we have already said, James finds them always

16The artistic alchemist does not want only a symbolical
approximation of reality, but reality itself, not ^old alone, but
the ability to re-create gold on his own. He wants to knew the full
taystery of creation itself*

17
Leon Edel (ed.), The Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. xv,
18

,

Ibid., p. 52.
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"ia the logic of the particular ease":
If life, presenting us the germ and left
merely to herself in such a business, gives the
case away, almost always before we can stop her,
what are the signs for our guidance, what the
priraary laws for a saving selection, how do we
know when and where to intervene, where do we place
the beginnings of the wrong and the right deviation?
Such would he the elements of an inquiry upon which,
I hasten to say, it is quite forbidden ne here to
embark. I but glance at them in evidence of the rich
pasture that at every turn surrounds the rurainant
critic. The answer say be after ail that mysteries
elude us, that general considerations fail or mis
lead, Mid 'that eyeb the fondest of artists ne*e<l ask
no wider range tk'an* tKe logic'ofTKe 'partlc'tflar
case tallies ain'ef'".'^'
It is as though Jams were saying that life evades no one less
than it does the artist who wants to capture it whole; yet it
evades no one more than the artist if he does not go at it piece-

This admittedly is a complex artistic approach, despite the
apparent simplicity of the particular ease; but, then, complex Binds
demand complex illusions, and, conversely, complex illusions require
complex minds to interpret the®, Janes provides both in his works
by concentrating on the "particular case," which, in its "crystaline"
ability to reflect accurately the anomalies and obscurities of life,
seems to be no less rebounding and eliptical in its ambiguities and
mysteries than life appears to be.
In the process, what he creates is "the organ of life"—-the

19Ibid.,

p. 52.
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Hystericus entity his fictional novelist, Vereker, in the story,
"Hie Figure in the Carpet/' said no on® had ever fathomed in his
works, but which it seemed to Vereker (and, ao doubt, to James him
self) he should search for.
No one, of course, could ever fathom the "Organ of Life"; be
cause, although he sight discover what Jaaes's "Figure in the Carpet"
is, he would never know, in any literal way, what the "Figure in the
Carpet" reflected. Hie "Figure in the Carpet" is the Jamesian,
convoluted, apparently ambiguous technique, by which he tries to
represent life. It is the artistic aeons by which he tries to re
create life, by involving his readers in what h© called "the abyss
of ambiguity," the "rein of the great a®biguity," the "huaan lia
bility to fall into traps and be bewildered."
In other words, it is James's attempt to involve his readers
in the immense "Organ of Life" itself—which is life's illusory
reality, its mystery, or, if not life's mystery, then in man's
paradoxical predilection to assuae that lif© is mysterious and
illusive, and—like the governess in "The Turn of the Screw"—to
throw himself passionately into it.
*

*

*

"Hi© governess, herself, feels this ambiguous lusaaa response to
mystery, when, after permitting Mrs. Grose, the housekeeper to kiss
her and seal (what she presumes to be) a "oneness" between the®,
she muses at length on her position at Bly and feels that it is
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"fin©"—but "perhaps £ trap, not designed, but deep---to
delicacy, perhaps to [her] vanity; whatever in fher] was most
excitable." (italics mine) Later she is to look back cm the ©vents
which follow this musing as a "change ... like tne spring of a
beast," Sut at the moment she ©uses on her own "discretion," her
"quiet good sense," and her "general high propriety"; she feels
tranquil and justified"; and she has the faith that these merits
will "publicly appear" in tine.
The governess's raising turns toward ronance and toward the hope
of raeetinj* someone who would "stand before her and smile and approve."
Almost immediately, her "ioagination turn fs] real," (italics mine)
and at that very soment she sees a ghost upon the battlements who
is "not the person [she} had precipitatedly supposed (not, that is,
her employer, as Edmund Wilson surmises),20
The ghost stands there "wearing no hat." Later she finds herself
hesitant to mention her discovery to Mrs. Grose, although she ration
alizes her notive as an "instinct of sparing her coapanion." Tne
shock of her meeting with the ghost has "sharpened all [her] sense,"
Mid she feels Bly has been "subject to an intrusion."
Hie ghost, of course, is obviously, the governess's wild
"imagination turned real"; she is beginning to confuse her desires
for reality, and is asking (at least for herself) "reality" of her
desires; that is, "reality" of her involvement with mysterious

20
Henry Jawes, Casebook, op. cit.
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particulars, which, themselves, have been no taore ambiguous than
"psychological particulars"—that is, a few random remarks dropped
by Mrs, Grose, a gesture or two, misconstrued.
A few days later the governess sees the same ghost again,
staring in through the dining room window, "a forward stride in
[their] intercourse," and she feels she has been "looking at him
for years and had known his always"; and, furthermore, she surmises
from the ghost's diverted stare that he actually carae there "for
someone else*"
She dashes around, "out of duty*1 to confront the ghost, finds
him gone, but feels that he "was there or was not there; not there
if [she] ditto't see hiia." (italics sine)
Mrs, Grose comes upon the scene, and the governess immediately
places herself in the same spot where the ghost had stood, and whan
Mrs. Grose responds to her presence there in the saae way she her
self had responded to the presence of the ghost, the governess
wonders why Mrs. Grose "should be scared." This wonder immediately
turns to positive conviction in her raind that she no longer "needs
to respect the bloom of Mrs. Grose"j and she now has a feeling that
she "must share" her knowledge with the housekeeper,
*

*

*

In regard to this urge to "share" diabolical knowledge, it
should be remeabered (digressing again, for a moment) that in the
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preamble to the reading of Douglas's handwritten tale about the
governess, when the guests, in the ho»e where Douglas is staying,
have finally convinced hie to read his old nanuscript, and are
grouped about his for the hearing, the odd tale which calls this
story to Douglas's wind is one told by another guest, about a snail
boy who had seen a ghost and who had awakened his mother, "not to
dissipate his dread Mid soothe hist to sleep again, hut to encounter
also, herself, before she had succeeded in [quieting his fears], the
sane sight that had shaken his,"
Hie diabolic innocence of the boy is what is interesting, and
relevant.
Also interesting and relevant—although the relevance will not
immediately sees clear— is the coincidence that Douglas, the
narrator of this story [the "envelope narrator" once removed from
the Jamesian "envelope narrator" who is telling the story to us] was
himself, like Miles, once under the influence of this same governess,
when he confronted her at his family's estate (the name of which is
not given), "on erasing down the second suBttaer" from Trinity. He was,
at the time, tan years her junior; and like Miles he also had a
sister under her tutelage,;
./

When Douglas is quizzed by one of his listeners about who® it
was the governess was in love with, Douglas is able to evade the
question, which he apparently finds too acute, or too disruptive,
when the Jaaesian "envelope narrator" quickly answers for hira by
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saying: "Time will tell"—to which evasion, Mrs, Griffin, one of
the listeners, says: "Well, if I don't know who she was in love
with, I know who he was."
Mrs« Griffen, of course, is referring to Douglas, who has al
ready said of the governess: "She was a sost charming person, but
she was ten years older than I. She was ay sister*s governess."
Now, it would be interesting, aid one more diabolical turn-oftho-screw- in this story (that is, on® aor© example of the "stretch
ing power*1 of Janes*s anomalous particular case), if it could be
proved that Miles and Douglas were me and the same person (there is
no proof that Miles died at the end of the story, only that the
governess felt his heart stop). iiy this reading, Mrs. Griffen's
remarks "I know who he was," could vaean, not who Douglas was in love
with, but literally who he was (his identity)f And to examine so
Eiinutely such an innocent grouping of words is doing no wore than
J«$es*s expects, because he himself obviously left many such phrases
purposely open to aabiguous interpretations—particularly in his use
of pronouns. It is sometimes impossible to tell, simply by the group
ing of James's pronouns, who is saying what to whoa.
Douglas denies that the initial experience was his ownj but,
actually, the initial involvement; that is, the governess's viewing
of her experience was not Douglas's Involvement, either. It was
peculiarly the governess's. Douglas says that he took down nothing
but the "impress ion." "I took that liere," Douglas says, very
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significantly tapping his heart, "I've never lost it."
Jaaes's "envelope narrator" is the next to ask the question:
"was the governess in love?" to which Douglas replies: "You are
acute. Yes, she was in love. That is, she had been. That case
out—she couldn't tell her story without its coming out, I saw it
and she saw it; but neither of us spoke of it,"
And then Douglas almost negates this kind of speculation entirely,
by saying: "I xcraeaber the time and the place—the comer of the
lawn, the shade of the great beaches and the long, hot summer after
noon,"
Most of Miles's important encounters with the governess are at
night in his rooa, or, at least, inside the house—except for one;
and that is his talk with her outside tho church, just before sho
flees hone in confusion, after he and she startle one another with
their awareness of the other's perceptiveness.
It would be impossible to prove this point, that Douglas and
Miles are one and the saae person; and perhaps not even profitable;
but it would be on© sore tum-of-the-screw, one sore exaaple of wan's
"precious liability to fall into traps and be bemrildered," which is
one of Jaaes's chief demands upon a story, since it can only "thicken"
or "size u|>" the story.
These various interpretations, James says, "stiffen the whole
texture";

62

The apparitions » , . are matters as to which
in themselves, really, the critical challenge
(essentially nothing ever but the spirit of fine
attention) may take a hundred forms—and a
hundred felt or possibly proved infirmities is too
great a nusaber. (Mir friends' respective minds
about they, on the''other kand,~are ai different
aatter^clialTenge'able, and repeated?)',
you'like,
but never challengeable without some consequent
farther stiffening o£ the whole texture. (italics
k
nine)"
Jaaes is probably as consciously anbiguous about Douglas's true
relationship to the governess as he is about Miles's and the govern
ess's relationship. If nothing else, as just indicated, it creates
tension; but James seems to be giving us clues by his reference to
years in the introduction. The governess was ten years older than
Douglas; she had died twenty years before Douglas's telling of the
story to the houseguests; it had been forty years since Douglas was
told the story by the governess.
But the reader doesn't know how old Douglas was when he caste
down fro® Trinity, lias he ten (like Miles), or a young nan? And we
don't know how old the governess was when she told Douglas her story
(only that she was ten years older than he), or how old Douglas is
at his tailing of the story to his guests, except that she was evident
ly young enough to stir love in his heart when he was a boy, and he
is agile enough, when telling his story to the houseguests, to be
kicking logs in the fire.

2*The

Future of the Movel, op. cit., p. 67.
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Whether Miles and Douglas are, in fact, one, or not, the saae
effect is achieved, nevertheless, Douglas is just one sore "ghost"
in the long chain of possible misrepresentors of simple fact in this
story. Just as the governess steps into the shoes of Quint, in order
to frighten Mrs. Grose, Douglas (possibly Miles) next steps into the
shoes of the governess by reading her story to his listeners, anions;
who® is tli© Jasnesian "envelope narrator," who relates it to us.
The ironic twist of this dosino-like succession, or concentric
ring, or elipticai series of stories-within-stories is that the
corrupting (or educating) involved is always undertaken out of a
sense of duty or love. Douglas tells his listeners that the governess
would not have told him the story about the ghosts, if she hadn't
liked him; and, ostensibly, Douglas and the "envelopenarrator":
[James] tell their listeners [us] the tale for the same reason.
Under the guise of mere story telling, what is obviously felt to be
soaehow diabolical, is imparted, on the pretense of duty, or love,
or liking.
This presence of moral ambiguity is the reason for the repeated
question in the introduction: "Who does the governess love?" Douglas
says that the story won't tell, "not in any literal, vulgar way";
and when he is first asked if the story is "beyond everything," as
he described it, "for sheer terror?" the Jaiaesian "envelope narrator"
feels that Douglas "seemed to say it was not so simple as that." In
other words, he is saying, indirectly, that this is not a mere ghost
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story designed to instill shallow, physiological fright. At a loss
to qualify it, Douglas says: "For Dreadful—dreadfulnessl" (Or, as
Conrad put it in "The Heart of Darkness": "the horror, the horror").
Hie vital question being evaded is: which does the governess
love wore: good or evil, innocence or corruption? Is she attracted
to the children because she thinks then angelic, or because she thinks
the® deaonic.
Hie answer is to be found in the minds of the reader.
In any event, this searching out of Motives, this suspicion of
surface meanings, this propensity to exaggerate facts which themselves
are mostly ambiguous, and read into then the possibilities one seeks
oneself, is just what Jaiaes expects of his reader, because it puts his

in the position of the governess as she stands outside the dining room
window, imitating the stance of the ghost she has just seen, and
awaiting there, expectantly, the reaction of Mrs, Grose, the house
keeper, at whose expense she is playing this diabolic little trick.
When Mrs. Grose surprises the governess by being startled and
bewildered by her behavior, the governess imaediately assuaes that she
no longer "needs to respect the bloom of Mrs. Grose" and suddenly wants
to "share" her knowledge with her. She suggests that the other has
guessed at the identity of Quint.
Mrs. Grose's bewildered response is: "I haven't guessed ...
how can I if you don't imagine?"22 she tries to alter the drift of

22

Mrs. Grose's response is exactly what Jraes's himself would
be, speaking to the reader.
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their conversation by suggesting church. To this suggestion the
governess rejoins: "Oh, I*bi not fit for church," (italics nine)
Upon which, she sees in Mrs. Grose*s eyes, the "faraway clioraer of a
consciousness sore acute."
Mr*. Grose, who probably represents in this novel the innocence
of ignorance—and also the irresponsibility of such innocent ignorance—
always avoids ultimate knowledge and tries to disdain responsibility.
"Such things are not for rae," she says of the school letter regarding
Miles* "dismissal" (for she can't—the governess assumes—read); and
she later tells the governess that the children are not in her charge,
T»»o governess (again, in her "crystaline" wanner) describes Mrs.
Grose as a "stout, simple, plain, clean, wholesome" woaan, "a magni
ficent monument to the blessing of a want of imagination," and as a
woiiian who had no direct "ccciMunion with the source of [the governess's]
trouble,"
Mrs, Grose plays the sane kind of role as Captain Delano in
Melville's story, "Benito Cerino"—the unassuming innocent who is
saved (bat who does not quite save others) because he never assumes
the true evil of his position and therefore does not bring destruction
upon himself.
Ironically, Mrs, Grose also assumes the role that Jamas histself
takes, generally—that of the artist who refuses to become involved
in his own illusions, in order that he sight remain innocent himself
of whatever interpretations are put upon his illusion—who can presume
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to innocence at the same tiiae that he exposes his readers to what
appear to be diabolical traps; the writer, that is, who remains un«
involved in what he claims is the general human condition, which is
to fall into traps and be bewildered.
It is here that James falls under suspicion of being only an
imitator of life, or a sere storyteller, fabricating romance for its
own sake, who is not interested in making, or causing to be made—
distinctions. Actually, this iminvolvement is just another exanple
of his irony*23
The governess describes the male ghost to Mrs. Grose, insists
that he "was no gentlenan" (probably, because he wore no hat), and
Mrs, Grose verifies the description as being like that of Quint, a
Corner valet at Sly,
In this first of the governess's assumptions, which is based on
no fact, whatsoever, and which is almost an out-and-out lie, she tells
Mrs, Grose that Quint was looking for Miles: "I know, I know I" she
cries, although there is no natural, literal way that she could have
known, Mrs* Grose admits knowledge of the former close alliance which
existed between Quint, an alliance which site tried, unsuccessfully, to
sever, but which she couldn't and wouldn't report to her employer,
because "he diita't like tale-bearing, he hated complaints."
Hie eutployer on liar ley Street has becotae, by this time, almost

^3To be discussed later*
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a symbol of God or Satan, or Ultimate Indifference. Hie governess
answers Mrs, Grose by saying that she herself would have told the
master—although later she does no such thing, herself, until
forced to it later, when a similar

is

she

arises.

situation

The governess again glories in the fact that she is an "expiatory
victim"

says;

whose duty it is

H$e

danger.

to

save the children for the Master. She

were cut off, really,

They

had nothing but

"thea" in italics

could

together; we

me,

and

refer to the

were united in our

I—well, I
children

had

them."

This

or to the ghosts,

fbr

it is used thus ambiguously each tine.
Hie governess begins to watch the children "in stiffled suspense"j
and soon she notices the children's

"charming"

alone "without appearing to drop her"; and she

way of letting her
is

a«azed by their

self-sufficiency; in fact, she feels she "walked in a world of their
invention" and
occasion,

(almost

regretably it

whatever, to call

upon

would

seem) that

of

ghost.

Azof" and
"There

immediately

one Element to another, found forcing

There is,

of course,

lake

no

lake—like the

anything," (italics mine) she

"none whatever; at least

before m and across the

the

she senses the existence of another

was no ambiguity in

proudly affirms,

no

[iters],"

SOOT after this, the governess takes Flora to
"Sea

they "had

as

in

the conviction I,

from

to what I should see straight

as a consequence of raising my eyes."
ambiguity, because

she has already

eliminated the possibility of it, even before she raises her eyes.

She sees the female ghost and also assumes that Flora tries to
divert her attention from the ghost with a "morsel," a stick which
the

tries to force

ckiId

Freudian
symbols

symbolism

into

of this episode

have been noted by

aid cries:

"They

the hole of a piece of wood. (Hi©

Edmund

and

the use of the hat and lake

Wilson) She rims to Mrs. Grose

know, they knowI"

In response to Mrs, Grose's blank expression, she replies"
"What we know!" and she says, "Flora saw!" and,

therewith,

she imme

diately declares the ghost to be her predecessor, Miss Jessel, al
though she ttas never seen Hiss Jessel. To Mrs, Grose's
that

tiiey

verify her finding, by asking Flora, the governess cries:

"Ho, for God's sake, don't • • • she'll
Hie housekeeper
ness of

the

surnises that

if

there are depths,

the child
thy

Conrad's

is concealing aware

governess, "HO, no,"
"Heart of Darkness,"

depths."

describing

eyes "as if they

Miss Jessel she says the ghost stared at her

might

she associates herself
the

liel"

ghost site is doing it to spare

the governess declares, like Kurtz in

in

proposal

really

have

resembled sine" (the second

obviously with the

ghosts) and

she

own

time

describes

look as "indescribable," a "fury of intention."

The governess then poses a real puzzle of this story, a possible
flaw or opaque virtue in its

mechanics,^

when she asks Mrs. Grose how

24
I as indebted to Professor Fred Korsten for suggesting the
alternative opinion that this apparent "flaw" in the story sight be
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she could have described

the

ghost "to the last detail," if

she

did

not really see it. She way, of course, have seen a picture of Miss
Jessel;

but, if

so,

the picture is not

that one hole in the
squarely

illusion, where

at one another and

shake

mentioned

interpreter

their

by

Janes,

and

head wryly

author

iter*

is

can look

at the cleverness

a riierit: it being the crucial opaque center of the story which keeps
it truly ambiguous, which leaves the story open to the interpretation
that the ghosts are to be taken literally, and not figuratively or
as figments of the governess's imagination* I tend to agree (see
footnote 26), and use the word "flaw" only because (in this one case)
I don 't give Janes the credit for having realized (beforehand) the
importance of this incidence.

If I did, I should have to assuue that

he did want to have us take the ghosts literally, in which case, he
wouid either have written a mere "ghost" story (which 1 don't think
Janes ever meant us to believe, despite his tongue-in-cheek avowals
of sane), or that he meant the ghosts to represent an external force
of evil. And with this I would heartily disagree. Evil in Henry
James's world is not a force fro* without (as it was, for instance,
for his father), but tie rely awareness, knowledge, viewed perversely.
Evil is the ectttaltt«eat, at one" poie of reference, of a charged
"truth" not accurately (that is, perversely) transmitted. It is the
possession of knowledge viewed diabolically by someone without it.
Once he possesses the perversely viewed knowledge, that person hisself becomes a "repositor" looked at diabolically or enviously, as
the case way be„ Evil, in Jaaes's world is utterly in the eye of
the beholder and every beholder is, at some point, tewporarily be
wildered. !Vhen he is no longer bewildered, he no longer transmits;
he is no longer alive; he is a dead battery, a lifeless repositor.
Life, in James's World, is thus, passionate curiosity. Evil, con
sequently, is limitation artificially imposed by inadequate knowledge.
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of one and the willful duplicity of the other.25
Aftor

learning from Mrs. Grose about the

former

"conspiracy"

of Miles and Quint, a finding which she labels

"immensely

purpose," she waits for further

"I

she says; and she finds

her

In describing (in her
children

develops in

times, indeed,
traces of
one

the

waited and I waited,"

waiting "so iraaensely »ore interesting."

"crystaline

manner")

the

attitude of the

towards her at this state of the story, the governess says

sonething curious which
suddenly

developments.

to

when

little

sight

Flora

account for the

at the end.

"vulgarity"

The governess says: "Some

I dropped into coarseness, I

understandings between them

of thea should keep ae

occupied while

It is possible that the

children

which

were

perhaps

cam© across

[the children]

by

which

the other slipped away.
simply devising ways of

escaping the governess's "coarseness"—coarseness (the extent of which

This desire for, yet fear of, illusion and its apparent opposite,
reality, is a thetste which the arch ironist, Jean Oenet develops in his
play. From the Balcony. Everyone in this play is after illusion—even
the Revolutionary, who most abhors illusion and the bourgeois human need
for it; and each manipulates his private, "Whore-house," illusion con
summately and demands an illusion which is absolutely consuming in its
potentialities. Hut he also demands, at the same time, one tiny flaw
in the manipulated illusion, because only by this concrete proof that
he is pretending illusion, can he maintain it and also maintain his
belief that lie will not be swallowed up in the horror of unambiguous
reality: total, absolute, meaningless, nonduelistic actuaTity which
precludes no illusory state into which to flee, once it oecoaes too
oppressive. This, of course, is also a favorite Conradian these ("The
Secret Sharer"), Shavian ("Don Juan in Hell"), Kafkian (The Castle);
and one also excellently developed by Ingaar Bergaan in his movie, The

Magician, not to mention Herman Hesse's treatment of it in Hie
Steppenwolf.
"

71

the reader can't know) which may be the source later of Flora's
"horrors" in speech that so overwhelm Mrs.

Grose.

Soon after this, the governess meets the ghost of Quint upon
the stairway.

They face each

There "was nothing in

other with their

[herself]

that

didn* t

"cocnnon intensity,"

meet and measure

hin."

(italics mine) She returns to her roon to discover Flora looking
out the window.

Hie child turns to her "in so

and so little of her

nightgown"

that,

as

rauch of her candour

she says:

"I had never

such a sense of losing an advantage acquired (the thrill of which
had been so prodigious)."
Hie voyeuristic flavor of this passage is representative of
her entire attitude towards the supposed coramunion of children and
demons. When the child tells her that she did not see anyone out
side the window, the governess thinks she "lied," and she
why

she

does not just

confront the child with her own lio,

wonders

"give

it to her straight in her lovely little lighted face," in the
expectation that they both sight "learn perhaps in the strangeness
of

[their]

A

fate, where [they] are and what it means."

few nights

later the governess sees

stairway in a position of woe,

which

the

female ghost on the

she herself is

later

to duplicate

exactly, even to the cause. She returns to Flora, and this time she
is convinced

the child

is communing

with

outside the window. The "striking of a
she says.

Flora,

the ghost of Miss Jessel

match

complete[s] the

picture,"

she says, "was face-to-face with the apparition we
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had set at the lake,"
What the governess does not realize is that it sight possibly
be only her own image she sees outside the window—reflected in the
window glass—particularly since she says she just before lit a match,
the light fro® which would throw her image, forward and reflect it,
She goes towards the boy's room, but is conscious that someone
is moving about outside. She goes into another room, beneath the
tower, and looks out into the yard. There she sees Miles and assumes
that he is contuning with the ghost of Quint, who she supposes is on
the tower, although she cannot see the tower, since she is directly
under it. Both children sight very well be looking out and up at the
moon; although it is more probable that they aare communing, not with
the moon, or the ghosts either, but with one another, playing a gase
on the governess—Miles from down in the yard and Flora out her
window. This possibility gains substantiation when Miles later
admits to the governess that his being outside was all a trick be
tween hia and his sister to surprise the governess and convince her
that he was not just a good little boy.
There is still another possible explanation of the ghost's
appearance, which would be another, aor© devastating turn-of-thescrew, aii explanation which seems to be borne out by one of Mi les*s
statements later. "Ibis is the possibility that the children at no
time commune with the ghost of their own sex (if they comtme with
them at all), but actually with the ghost of the opposite sex. This
would explain (if we first agree with the idea of the children's being
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corrupt) why Flora did not see Miss Jesse1 by the lake (she would
only have seen

Quint,

were he to appear)} and it would explain why

Miles, later on, does not see the ghost of Quint outside the dining
room window, but does sees to expect to see a female, since he asks:
"Is

it

she?"

However, this,

again, is falling into the

laid

carefully

trap

which James has prepared for usj it is failing into the habit of
assuming one's desires for reality. Such a twist
would ®ake the story even store "horrible" in its
the question is,

of

the screw

implications,

but,

on© desire

such

eventualities?

When Mrs. Grose suggests that

they

inform the Master about the

should

situation at Ely, the governess imagines the contempt he
for the

"fine

attention to

machinery
[her]

[she]

had set in

motion

would

to attract his

slighted charas." Later she watches for

ghost "in vain in the

circle

of the shrubbery . .

unaccompanied and eapty, and [she] continue [s]

have

. But

Quint*s

they resiain

unmolested;

if un

molested

one could call a young woman whose sensibilities had, in

the

extraordinary fashion, not

most

declined

She realises that the loss of this
[her]

also

demands a reason

with

why no

would "distress

wonders why

resent [her] inexorable ... perpetual

moment Miles confronts her
he

sensibility

such store than to keep it." She also

"never

but deepened."

the

society,"

accusations. He

wants

children

and at this

sore freedoms

plans have been made for

his

return

to school, and he wants to have communication with his uncle.

TMs immediately makes the governess want to get away from the
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boy, and instead of attending church with the

children

(she is out

side the church with Miles), she dashes hose with the plan of leaving
lily

at

once.

She sits down upon the stairway in the

sane position

and attitude of woe she had formerly seen the female ghost adopt; and
when she walks into her

classroora,

a

moiaent

later, she is only

slisrhtly

startled to find Miss Jesse1 sitting at her desk, writing a letter,
regarding, not her

own,

but

the

governess's presence as

an intrusion.

Since the children, upon returning fro® church, do not enquire
about her desertion, the governess goes to Mrs. Grose, who now "faces
the flame fron her straight chair in the dusky, shining roar,"; and to
the governess the housekeeper is a "large, clean, image off the 'put
away*—of drawers closed and locked and rest without a remedy." She
discovers that the children have told Mrs. Grose that they oust all
do nothing but what the governess likes. The governess then tells
Mrs* Grose an obvious lie—that she returned house to meet a friend,
"A friend—you?" Mrs, Grose replies in evident amazement, to which
the

governess replies? "Oh, yes, I have a couple [italics mine],"

And then she tells Mrs. Grose

that

she cane hoise to talk with Miss

Jessel, although this was not her consciously expressed reason (and,
furthermore, there
the

was

not even a recorded exchange between her and

ghost). She tells Mrs, Grose that Miss Jessel "suffers the

torments," and she says that Miss Jessel "wants Flora,"
She agrees then to write to her employer. That night she goes
to Milos*s rot®!. In

equivocal

terras they discuss their general
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situation once more; she embraces mid possibly frightens the boy;
and there is an unexplanable draft of cold wind that blows in,
despite the closed windows. The boy
The

next day Miles

approaches

abruptly

asks to be left alone.

her of his own accord and entertains

her by playing upon a piano.

She

that she forgets about

and when she remembers that she has

Flora;

is wrapt up in

watching

the boy

"slept at her post," she surmises that Miles's entertainment was a
trick to get her aside so that his sister could slip away froa
She dashes to the front hall and

confronts

her.

Mrs. Grose. The two of

the® search the house.
Then, without a hat—because "that woman is always without
one"—the governess goes out to search for Flora, accompanied by
Mrs. Grose, She has told Mrs. Grose that Miles is upstairs with
Quint and that Flora must be at the lake with Miss
Flora across the lake;

the child

the governess,

a

without

hat:

pointblank,

They

find

is surprised at the appearance of

"Where are your things?" she asks.

"Where yours are, my dear?" the governess
asks the child,

Jesse1.

replies;

and thai she

where Miss Jessel is.

Immediately, Miss Jessel appears before

the

eyes of the governess.

This appearance produces in her a "thrill of joy at having brought
proof,"

She

discovers that Mrs. Grose does not share her vision,

nor does

the

child admit to doing so.

Flora is horrified now, not

necessarily by the ghost, but possibly by the governess; and she
appears suddenly to have becoae like an old wosan.
"What a

dreadful

turn, to

be

sure, Miss!" Mrs.

Grose

replies;
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and she tries to confort the child into thinking the shole thing is
a joke. Flora and Mrs. Grose return alone to the house and the
governess sinks down on the grass in despair.
when she returns to the house she finds that Flora's things have
been removed frcm her room; she discovers from the housekeeper that
the child now lives in terror of her, and that she has begun to
utter "horrors." The governess has the child taken away from Bly,
and Mrs, Grose leaves with her, sounding a strange note, by saying
to the governess, who plans to stay to work cm Miles: "I'll save you
without hi»."
This possibly eeans that she—having given up on Miles, will
save Flora, not the governess. We don't know for sure to who® she
eakes the remark.
The governess and Miles are left alone together, lie had come
to her the night before, because, evidently, he finally liked to be
close to her; mid, the next day, he repeats this direction of his
sentiments. The governess tries to draw from him the secret reason
for his dismissal fro® school. She feels "she had nothing aore to
teach hia," but that it would be "preposterous, with a child so
endowed, to forego the help one sight wrest fro® absolute intelligence."
She admits to the boy that she stayed on purely to discover his
secret: "Well, yes—I may as well make a clean breast of it," she
says. "It was precisely for that" (that she stayed).
Peter Quint suddenly appears again at the window, as she
continues her probing for Miles's secret; and she feels as though
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she is "fighting with a denon for a hunan soul«M

Miles admits that

he stole the letter she had written to his uncle, because, he said,
he wanted to see what she had written about him. The governess in
stantly feels that the "cause was [hers] and that [she] should surely
get all,"
As Quint watches then from outside the window at Miles's hack,
Miles adnits that he "said things" at school, things which were
reported, things that he told only to people he liked, things that
were told to other people they liked.
The boy's sisdeataeanor, in effect, is probably no more or less
than the misdemeanor of which the various narrators of this story
are guilty or innocent: he tells innocent (at least, ambiguous,
happenings) which are misconstrued, at will, by people, like the
governess, who desire to know the worst.
The governess is exasperated by Miles's innocent reply, which
in no way vindicates her. Suddenly, she "springs upon" the boy,
ostensibly to shield him frora Quint's ghost. She shrieks, 'Ho aore,
no aore, no wore!" at the ghost of Quint.
Miles cries: "Is she here?—a question which baffles even the
governess, because no female has been referred to.

Edmund Wilson

asstsaes that the boy has scsaehow communicated with his sister, and
has learned the circumstances of her delusion; but James does not
tell of any sudi meetingj in fact, he aakes a point of saying that
the children are kept apart. It !tay be that James only wanted to
draw fro® the boy an exclamation which would prove, beyond any doubt.
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the boy's innocence; although it is just as likely that he used
this fceans, instead, as a way of maintaining ambiguity—at least,
in regard to the boy.
The governess is staggered by the feainine pronoun. She "sieze[s],
stupifieti—some sequel to what {they] had done to Flora." Her instant
reaction to this realization, however, is to "show the boy something
better still than that," She would confront hi® not with the ghost
of Miss Jesse!, but with that of Quint. Or else—if her motives are
indeed sincere—she would confront hi® with no ghost at all, but with
©mpty space. She repeats the word "she," and Miles answers her
stupification with: "Hiss Jessell"
Mow it may be that Miles—if he did see ghosts—saw only the
ghost of Miss Jessel, aid here, he is expecting to see her again.
If this were the governess's realization, her horror of what she
has done to Flora is simply her realization that Flora, possibly,
had never seen the feraale ghost, that the girl was either innocent
of seeing ghosts at all, or, possibly, saw not Miss Jessel, but
Quint, instead. When the governess then tells the boy that there is
something better than Miss Jessel to be seen at the window. Miles
creist

"It's he?" in the fora of a question. The governess immediately

pounces for the proof. She cries: "rfhom do you mean by he?"
The next exclamation is always assumed to co®e frora Miles but
we can't actually be sure, by the arrangement of the words on the
page, who actually says the words:

"Peter Quint, you devilI"
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It could be the governess angrily putting words into the
boy's mouth, forcing the reply which she wants to hear froci him;

or, it could actually be the hoy speaking*

But it does seera more

likely that the boy would call the governess a "witch," rather than
a devil, whereas the woman would naturally refer to the boy in this
manner.
To add to this argument, the next exclamation of the boy*3 is:
"Where?"--a response which, unexpectedly, overjoys the governess.
"I have you," she thinks; and she surmises that Quint has lost
the boy forever. She replies: "There, there 1" obviously indicating
the window at the boy's back, the view of which has been, up to now,
cut off from hiis. Miles turns around and sees—as the governess is
led to believe—nothing "but the quiet day."
If she is demonic, she thinks she has taken him away from Quint;
if she is good, she thinks she has exorcised the deson. But if tae
boy is truly demonic, he has simply been cut off frota the source of
his power and he dies.
The question exists of how, if Miles is innocent, he could know
about Quint's ghost, since he possibly refers to hint when he asks:
"Is it he?" The boy could, of course, be thinkin? of his uncle, who®
he ami the governess had just been discussing in regard to the stolen
letter, Wilson's explanation is that the boy somehow conraunicated
with his sister, but this would not entirely explain the technical
difficulty.
Clearly, the ultimate interpretation is left up to the reader.

so
James has reached a nearly sure balance.

The innocent readers will

never see the story as anything More than a ghost story about demonic
children (an irony in itself, since it is^the innocent who so easily
accept the possibility of there being such things as demons), and
the sore delving, more suspicious, nor© assuming ©inds will always
stumble upon an arabiouous author at the end of the story, and have
to bear the brunt of their own suspicions.
Technically, however, one thing is clear and unambiguous, and
that is the govemess*s reactions. Considering the raany assumptions
she stakes, which are based on no fact at all, one must conclude,
finally, that she herself, is either terribly frustrated, or sad.
There is the possibility that the children are innocent, but not the
governess. In spite of the anotaaloly that she holds "crystaline"
in her consciousness the record of the many anomalies and obscurities
on the story, and that she is the "authority," the only one from who®
we can get the facts, her "dreadful boldness of aind" finally reveals
her peculiarity for what it is although she does not, necessarily,
ever realist© it herself.
*

*

*

James's representative works are all this kind of ingenious
celebration of contradict!cm and stipulated aabifjuity. As in the
"Turn of the Screw," the interpretation of the ambiguities within
the work depends upon the temperament of the reader. The final
turn-of-the-screw may very well be at his expense. If he wants to
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assume the worse, if that is how his mind functions, then Janes
gives hi® all the rope he needs to hang hinself. Hi® story is itself
consciously ambiguous, in the sense that the final interpretation is
as much a reflection of the reader's nind as it is of the author's.
This means of filtering a story through the sometimes faulty
consciousness of one of the characters—a character who, yet, at the
sase tine—gives a clear picture of what happens for those who want
to see clearly (and is, in that sense, "crystaline"), demands
conscious adroitness on the part of the writer. To stake, as James
sayss
• ..the presented occasion tell all its story
itself, reaaln shut up in its own presence and
yet en that patch1 oJTstaTed-'out ground "becoise
thoroughly interesting and regain thoroughly
clear, is a process not remarkable, no doubt,
so long as a very light wight is laid cm it,
but difficult enough to challenge and inspire
great adroitness so soon as the elements dealt
wtVh begin to shape up,1'''" "nellies mine)2"
The governess exactly mirrors what she sees at Bly, and in that
sense, she hold "crystaline in her consciousness the record of the
aany anomalies and obscurities" around herj but her reflect!arts
iipan what she sees, her assumptions about the® are her own eccentric
way of evaluating experience, and not, any longer, a coraott denominator
of human experience. Her "authority," finally, is disproved by irony:
first by Janes, who gradually lets us see the difference between when

The Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. 65.
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she sees and what she reports: then—if the reader is discerning—
by the reader. If the reader is not discerningt then he himself
becomes an object of irony.
This "crystaline" treatment of the "particular case" seems to
extend the "picture" indefinately—as indefinate as are the minds of
all of the readers who will look into it. Or, as Blacknur says of
James's technique, generally: "The secret of perception in tlie reader
becomes very near the secret of creaticm in the artist."

CHAPTER IV
THE HUMAN PROPENSITY FOR INVOLVEMENT
A person's disposition to involve and expose himself in
illusion—this general human liability to "fall into traps and be
bewildered"* is the haaan propensity upon which Jaraesian drama (and
drama generally) depends. It is upon the ground of this general
human predicament that a protagonist stands, and from which he demands
our sympathy. In fact, it is only when he succeeds in remaining (Hi
this connon ground that he jrains for himself the name "protagonist".
He becomes an "antagonist" when he forfeits his common humanity; to
be free of bewilderment.
No one is more sympathetic (even a villain) than when he seems
most bewildered, even when he is only bewildered by his own villainy,
or by his inability to perceive his own villainy.
In this sense, the governess in "Hie Turn of the Screw," for
instance, is always a protagonist, and, therefore, always naintains
our sympathy, even when she is aost bewildered. This, actually, is
rather remarkable about the governess, because, other than her be
wilderment, which takes the for® of self-delusion, there is very
little else about her that is remarkable—other than that she seeas
so human. She is one of the jaost self-deluding creatures imaginable;

*The Future of the novel, op. cit,, p, 56.
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and yet, so humanly chaining is her bewilderment, so perceptive
her mind, so reflective her soul, so crystaline her consciousness —
so generously ambiguous her point of view—-that not only do we permit
her to completely dominate our winds and attention, but wo alaost
permit her to delude us, also.
And this sort of thin<r, of course, is just what Jaaes wants of
us. If we weren't liable to delusion, we vouldn*t be hunan; he
wouldn't want us to be reading his bodesj we wouldn't be able to get
involved in thera.

His effectiveness lasts only so long as the general

let of husanity is to fall into traps and be bewildered.
Yet in order to expose his readers to "bewilderment," Jaaes must
be ingenious (complexity being innately, his second nature}. He irmst
be ingenious in order to outwit the reader; and it is necessary for
hia to outwit the reader because the reader aabivalently demands a
craplex illusion which not only wakes hin appear to be

likewise ingenious

(that is, able to manipulate illusion), but also suspends hint in
illusion—-illusion being what the htKian consciousness has the greatest
propensity for.
Ironically, Jaaes must appear to do all this at the saae time
he seeas not to. He nust, in other words, appear not to be too in
genious; because if he were too ingenious, he would shatter the mirror,
break the crystal, destroy the illusion. He would play havoc with
tue necessary ambiguous relationship which must exist between the

85

illusionist and his audience. Ho would, in other words, appear to
be too gloatingly unbewildered; he would appear not to be human, to
be either too inhueanly dispassionate or too passionately nanipula. 2
tive.
Yet the artist, too, no less than the wader, feels a need for
total involvement. Hie artist's natural ispulse is to involve hiaself
totally in his own illusion, to display his ingenuity obviously (avid
thus elicit credit for his illusion) at the same tin© that he joins
the reader in the labyrinth. However, if ha is too obviously mani
pulative he can lose his reader as completely as when he loses
creative perspective.
Jmes keeps out of his illusions (at the sa»»e tine that he se@®s
to be lost within them) by limiting his objectivity, by filtering
his "pictures" through the consciousness of his "reporters," his
"precursors," his "envelope narrators,"
lie then reveals his ingenuity wore—at the saa© time that he
seems t© reveal it even less—by Baking his "reporters" also seem
not to be too ingenious* He does this for the same reasons so that
they, too, will not seem to be too ingenious, so that they, too, will
see® natural, will sees normal:
.. ,«e want it clean, goodness knows, but we also
want it thick, and wo get thickness in the human
consciousness that entertains and records, that

2For instance, a reader will readily suspend his disbelief for
another human, but he looks with fearful distrust upon a sorcerer,
since a sorcerer, by definition, has the power totally to involve
one. II© does not, necessarily, play the illusion gaiae fairly; he
might not uninvolve one.
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amplifies and interprets it ... her© prodigies,
when they cm® straight, come with an effect
imperiled; they keep all their character, on the
other hand, by loosing through some other history—
the indespensible history of somebody*s normal
relation to something.3
That is, so that they, too, partake of the general human propensity
to fall into traps and be bewildered.
In other words, without seeiaing to, James, as before said,
purposely portrays his people as being slightly dense I

Here is

the supreme irony of Janes's work: that his people who seen to be
overly perceptive, and who are subjects of critical derision for
just this reason, are cloudy in their knowing, are so overly per
ceptive that they constantly isisinterpret.^
And this is just as Janes wants it; because, despite their
higher plane of reference, despite the fact that they seen to breathe
air not usually filtered by ordinary consciousnesses, they are even
more hanan in their bewilderment. Even more natural.
... '0*ey may not be shown as knowing too much
and feeling too much—not certainly for their
remaining remarkable, but for their remaining
"Natural" and "Typical," for their having the
needftil comunicacies with their own precious

3The

4

Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. 66.

An irony that almost totally escapes a critic like Maxwell
Geisaar who, in his nearly hysterical attack on Jaraes in Henry .Tames
and the Jacobites (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963) stumble's,' absurdly,
into'aiatost every' trap this writer has laid for critics such as he.
Geisaar is almost too hurean. His density compares aaazingly to the
Governess in "The Turn of the Screw."
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liability to fall into traps and be bewildered.
It seems probably that if we wore never to be
bewildered there would never be a story to tell
about us; we should partake of the superior
nature of the all-knowing immortals whose annals
are dreadfully dull so long as flurried humans
are not, for the positive relief of bored Olympians
nixed up with them. Therefore it is that the wary
reader for the most part warns the novelist against
making his characters too interpretive of the mud
dle off fate, or in other worths, too divinely, or
pritjgishly clever ...
What this monitor, therefor®, always proclaims Janes says, is;
.. , give us plenty of bewilderment, so long as
there is plenty of slashing out at the bewilderment,
too. But don't, we beseech you, give us too such
intelligence; for intelligence—well endangers;
endangers not perhaps the slasher hinself but the
very slashing, the subject natter of the selfrespecting story. It opens too sany considerations,
possibilities, issues; it way lead the shattered
into dreary realms where slashing somehow fails and
falls to the "round.6
Jataes sees in excessive intelligence, not only a threat to the
"very slashing," which is what drama is, but also a threat to that
primary source of bewilderment which is life*s apparent anbiguity
itself; or, at least, the human propensity to look upon life as being
ambiguous—and then to throw himself eagerly into that asabiguity.
In Jaaesian fiction it is of what the artist is conscious, what
he reflects; and then, concurrently, what his characters are conscious
of and reflect, that make the story. The illusion lasts only so
long as the author, his characters, and tlie reader remain temporarily

5

Hie Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. 56.

6Ibid.

sa
in illusion about the knowledge or experience or critical power of
the other.
Most of the ironic burden, therefore, falls upon the "register"
of experience, the "reporters," the "precursor," as Jaaes calls them.
These fictional characters are almost always peg# for the reader's
ironical minds to use in working their way through illusions. Thus,
if the reader does not see through this purposely dense "reporter,"
if he remains in illusion about his, he will become, himself, a butt
of James's irony, and also a butt of irony for other readers who ar©
more perceptive.
It is when the reader tries to keep up with Jaaes's ironical
convolutions that the full burden of the story falls upon him. "Tell
sue of what the artist or character or reader is conscious," James says,
"and I will tell you what he is."
But first the reader oust participate in the illusion, partake
of the drama, and then find or lose himself in it, as the case may
be. If his discriminatory powers are as acute as James's—or, at
least, as acute as Jaaes hopes they will be, the reader will thread
his way through the labyrinth of ambiguities and ironies, through
the character's involvements; that is—around the James's pegs-ofiroay—and finally arrive alongside James at the final stairstep of
irony.
What Jaaes feared in himself and in his readers (and so disparaged
in his characters) is excessive irony, which tends to dissipate all
illusion, even that most genuinely presented—oven that which life
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itself (whatever its impetus) presents. If the artist is too soon
seen through, then his illusions will themselves become the stuff of
the skeptics, the object of irony, on the part of his audience, iiis
creative power will be dissipated.
The potential villain, therefore, in James's work is not
"bewildenncnt," not "illusion," but excessive irony. Irony nay be
the only safeguard one has against false illusion; it nay be the
human liability to humor which offsets the human liability to
bewilderment. Yet if a person overworks this liability as such as
he sometimes overextonds his desire for illusion, his final stance
can be one of irony-for-its-ovn-sake, which is only another kind
of illusion. Such a stance is paradoxical, and ambiguous, because
it annihilates before it can gain it, any meaning which it ostensibly
seeks.
A too highly developed ironist accepts nothing; yet he is so
meticulous in his dismissals, so almost aesthetic in his appreciation
of nothing, that his dismissal s@o»s a perverse kind of regard. Ho
seems not to be intelligently paradoxical, but childishly selfcontradictory.
Such persons, fiewselves, becooe objects of irony on the psrt of
artists, who look upon then as innocents—»knowled^eable innocents who
are revealed for what they are by soneono else only a little wore or
less knowledgeable (or, as the case aay be, by someone only a little
more or less innocent than they. The artist, or those who view this
type of person stand outside, at the raild, bemused stance, bewildered
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by such a person's apparent lack of bewiIda ment.
This is why, in Jamesian novels, it is often so difficult to
determine just who is innocent and who is not, Is it the knowledge
able, worldly, unbewildered types, like Gilbert Osmund, for instance,
of Portrait of A Lady? Or is it the bewildered, open-to-ignorance
initiates to life like Daisy Miller? Both types, in a way, sees
hardened against self-knowledge.; that is they both avoid meaning.
The Daisy Millers sees to refuse to see meaning, and the Gilbert
Osmunds refuse to look for it. Hie only type totally imerses her
self in life, the other refuses to do anything sore than clutch
aesthetically to its external objects. And both types, thereby,
appear to be innocent to those who are involved, not only in life, but
in the search for significance of their involvement. They appear
innocent, that is, to those #10 are somehow both inside and outside
life, viewing their involvement at the same tine,
Jaiaes himself—who said, "Much of life is fit only to enrich
our stores of irony"?- is very nearly guilty of the Osmund-like
predeliction to aestheticis™. Like Osiaund he seems to fondle each
object or situation or person ironically, the better to dismiss it
as not having been worth his perusal in the first place.

But, at

the same tine, he seems to be so fond of anything which he has
granted his dismissal, that he cannot seen to bear parting with it.

^The Future of fee Novel, op. cit., p. 174.
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Thus he seens to get no broader a view of the object or of himself
than his own ironic opinion of it. Yet he becomes so possessed by
objects he denies any propensity to power over himself, that he ends
up a prisoner of his wn possessive objectivity. He ends up nothing
sore than a sum of his objects, bound up in a vicious circle of his
own object-perusing, soIf-ar.ihi latin£ being.
Janes sews guilty of this predilection in such works as "The
Beast in the Jungle," and "The Jolly Comer," and, even, "The Turn
of the Screw"—works which almost fail to escape an irony-for-itsown-sake attitude, works which soon to bo literary "playthings."
Sidney Alexander, an art critic, writing for The Reporter, says
of this kind of art, which he refers to in its sore COBSROR najae as
"abstract art"?
. . . T h e m o n e n t y o u o l i n i n a t c subject, the
painting (or culpture) becomes its own subject;
that is, it becomes an object, thet is, it be cosies
a thing. Mow things that stand for nothing but
themselves can only proen the stuff of which they
are made, iience modern arts are obsessed by
"thingness"; hence all sorts of anterials are in
serted into the painting; hence the scratching and
gouging and didling of surfaces and hurling of
paint and making "sculptures" of junk ... What
else is there to do? Philosophically these objects,
these things, are not abstractions of anything,
internal or external. They coraunicate nothing
but self-consciousness of their own substance.
What saves James (and even his most "abstract" stories) is that his
art always refers outside of itself for meaning. It does this by
keeping tne human consciousness, the hu*an liability for involvement,

"Sidney Alexander, essay on Bernard Oerenson, "Trio Last
Aesthete," The Reporter (July 18, 1963).
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foreiaost in the picture. It simply keeps "people" as its objects,
as its "field of force"—people who are immersed in the ariajaolous
substance of life.
A Ja»esian character who best fulfills this role is Isabelle
Archer in Hie Portrait of A Lady, the foil to Gilbert Osmund.
Isabelle is also an ironist, of sorts, but she is always bewildered,
too, and therefore most human. As Jawes says of her; "The love of
knowledge in her mind co-existed ... with the finest capacity for
irgnorance."
Isabelle Archer's most human, and also most ironically consuming
characteristic is her candidness. She naively assumes that if she
can put her problems neatly in words, if they can find verbal ex
pression, they will somehow be solved. She has this same attitude
towards all illusions; and because of it (or despite it), the
illusive mystery of life envelops her all the more. She is like
Adel© Quested in Forster's novel, Passage to India, who is so sure
the right approach, the correct word, the definitive action will
dissolve all the mystery of the ages surrounding her and iii her—
when, in reality the saore she seeks to clarify the mystery around
her, the raoro confusing it becomes.
Isabelle Archer, in other words, is the "protagonist"—the
"first straggler"—the one raost involved in nystery, yet—at the
same time—the one least aware of this fact. She is least aware,
like Marcher in "The lieast xn znv Jungle," that the mystery of her life,
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which so awes and involves those around her, is simply her involve
ment in trying to dispell the mystery of her life. Even her husband,
Gilbert Osraund, whose own total lack, of involvement is what so
mystifies Isabella, almost finds himself transcended by his wife's
involvement. Even Gilbert Osmund is almost pulled out of himself
temporarily by observing his wife's involvement.
Isabella's plunging descent into bewilderment. Her "capacity
for ignorance," for illusion, for not seeing things as they really
are, even when what they are seems so transparently obvious to every
one around her, seems so paradoxical, so supremely ironic, that her
involvement in ironies, if not her personal unhappiness itself, draws
even the most ironical viewer into her orbit.
And what is particularly ironic is that—like the governess in
'The Turn of the Screw"—there is really not vory much interesting
or mysterious about the woman except this very human involvement in
mystery.
*

*

*

The "universal," therefore, which Janes has captured is a newkind of artistic reality, in which the pursuit, the involvement, the
process is half the reality. No other writer, excepting, possibly,
Conrad, has so effectively portrayed the complexity of this pursuit
and the labyrinthic convolutions a raind must thread in order to
illustrate it.
If this kind of continually "open lid" to reality were not what
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the reader looks for and expects, why would he go to art in the first
place?
One reason he goos, naturally, is for "vicarious experience."
Or as Janes asks and answers half the question himself:
tfhy should the representation be required, when
the object represented is soaccessible? ...
The answer ... appears to be that man combines
an infinite cunninn to getting it as cheaply as
possible. He will steal it whenever h® can. He
likes to live the lives of others, yet is well aware
of the points at which it may too intollerably
resemble his own. Hi® valid fable, mora than any
thing else, gives him knowledge, abundant, yet
vicarious.9
And James responds to this need, because he, too, "feels himself
all in the presence of an abyss of ambiguities, the mutual accoaraodation with which the reader leaves wholly to him":10
...(Uve us then the persons represented the
subject of the bewilderment (that bewilderment
without which there would be no quest of illusion
or of the fact of suspense, prime implication in
any story), as Much experience as possible ...
Such, in effect, are the words in which the
novelist constantly hears himself addressed, such
the pleas made by the would be victims of his
spell and ... he listens anxiously to the charge—
nor again can exceed his solicitude for the economy
of interest; but feels himself all in presence of
an abyss of ambiguities, the mutual accomodation
with which the reader wholly leaves hia. Experience,
you see, the picture of the exposed and entangled
state is what is required ..

^The Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. 33.
*°Tnc Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. 57.
11An

important part of the above quote has boen excluded—that
part concerning the reader's demand that there not be too rauch be
wilderment—but what is meant (as has been discussed previously) by
"bewilderment" here is excessive intelligence which tends to dissipate
illusion.
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What anazed Janes was not the desire on the part of humanity
and himself for bewildersnent, for illusion, this perverse desire to
be "always in the rein of the great ambiguity:" (If I have called the
taost general state of one's exposed and assaulted figures the state
of beuilder»ent ... It is rather witless to talk of , .. getting
12

rid of that highly recowsended categories of feeling.")

What amazes

him is that people will be taken in or be involved in very paltry
illusions:
. . . W h a t remains is the interesting oddity of
mystery—the anomaly that fairly dignifies the
whole circumstance with its strangenents: the
vender, in short, that men, women, and children
should have so much attention to spare for
Improvisations mainly so arbitrary, and fre
quently so loose. That, at the first blush,
fairly leaves us gaping. This great fortune
then, since fortune it seems, has been reserved
for aere unsupported and unguaranteed history,
the inexpensive thing, written in the air, the
record of what, in any particular case, has not
been . ,. This is the side of the whole business of fiction cm which it can always be challenged,*3
Involvement, that is, in illusions which don't meet the
philosophical challenges of the fore.
In fact, it is the novelist's responsibility not to provide
"inexpensive illusions; because, in effect, inexpensive illusions
leave the reader in illusion.

12

They cause hi® to confuse illusion

The Future of the Novel, op. cit., p. S8.
13
Ibid., p. 32.
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with the real thing; they do not cause him to recognize that his
involvement or lack of involvement is what is real. They siaply,
in other words, drown his in illusion.
This is the truth about illusion which the artist must cause
his render to realize. If he does so, he can then lean back in
esthetic contemplation of his accomplishment, confident that the
moral job has been dene, too. Which, incidentally, is the way
lames expresses his satisfaction with Flaubert's esthetic (not
moral) accomplishment in having produced Madamo i*ovary.
. . . May it not in truth be said that wo
practice our industry, so nany of us, at
relatively little cost just because poor
Flaubert, producing the aost expensive fictions
ever written, so handsomely paid for it? It is
as if this put it in our power to produce cheap
and thereby sell dear; as if, so expressing it,
literary honor being by his example effectively
secure for the firm at large and the general
concern, on its whole esthetic side, floated once
for all, we find our individual attention free
for literary indifference
Actually, the same praise Janes lavishes upon Flaubert he
deserves himself—and for almost the sarao reason. Jones never pro
vides inexpensive illusions in the place of the "real thing"; he is
no less concerned than Flaubert in finding the exact detail, just
the "right" word—except that he usually thinks in terms of the
"picture." In fact, he found the novel of his day to be a failure.

* The Future of the Novel, op. cit», j>. 145. (James, naturally,
in no way''aibpt's esthetic indifference, anymore than he adopts
moral indifference—although sometimes, because of his conscious
use of ambiguity, ha seess to.)
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"philosophically,"

in not providing

"comprehensive

pictures":

There are people who have loved the novel,
but who actually find themselves drowned in its
verbiage, and for whom even in some of its proved
manifestations, it is become a terror they exert
every ingenuity, every hypocrisy, to evade, the
indifferent and the alienated testify, at any rate,
almost as nuch as the omnivorous, to the rein of
the great ambiguity, the enjoyment of which rests
evidently on a primary need of mankind. The
novelist can only fall back on that—on his
recognition that man's constant demand for what he
has to offer is simply man's general appetite for
a picture. The novel is of all pictures the most
comprehensive and the most elastic. It will stretch
anywhere, it will take in absolutely everything* 15
At the
physical,

risk

of repeating:

psychological,

To James's unique consciousness,

objective, subjective, ruminative entities

are all "adorably pictoral," since they are always stained
the consciousness

of

through

his "reporters" and then refracted, still,

as "adorably pictoral" entities

through

the minds

of

his readers.

And since they are all "particulars" which are, at the same tirae,
anomalous and ambiguous—any novel of which they are a composition

is bound to be even more a

"comprehensive picture"—"elastic,"

capable of •Stretching" anywhere and

taking

in "absolutely everything,"

if the writer keeps them so.
If the artist didn't keep them so, his creations would be
merely imitative, since any "particular case" is potentially nothing
more than flat imitation.

lsThe

Future

Zola's Preiser's,

Morris's,

Sinclair
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Lewis*s works are full of such flat
scanned and almost as
entities

reflection, but hold

up

quickly

forgotten: topical, not typical

quickly

that blaze out

particulars—one-sided,

wonderfully

for

to no

because

raore;

one

reading, for one brief
the "«icture,"

of which

they are a summation, is not "comprehensive," but nerely peculiar—
unique for a tine, but not unique all-of-the-time which is to be
"classically unique."
reader at

any

tino,

The "anomalous particular case"

because it remains, in

involves

the

an "anomalous-

itself,

ambiguity."
What James seens to be implying (in terms of critical
that—if

theory)

is

a work resains "crystaline"—it will not only be unique—an

original perception of

life

or totality, but that it will

wore

directly imitate an absolute which defies finite definition, a
totality about which there will always

be disagreement.

The implication is that a work of art

is

a "classic," for in

stance, in proportion to the number of meanings to be gotten
"Heart of Darkness"
They

is

fro®

it.

an example, "The T\irn of the Screw" another.

can be read so many ways; so uany

meanings

can b© gotten out of

them, or incorporated into tliem by the readers, 16 that they can
appeal to a

greater

diversity of tainds that disagree about life or

16

"It derives fro® its fira roundness that sign of all rare
that there is something in it for everyone": Henry James*s
essay on Gustavo Flaubert, "Die Future of the Novel, op. cit., p.

works
155,

'

'

'
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totality, 17

But what appeals is not necessarily unity of
what the

work

ogre©went

about

of art is saying about totality, but agreement that

it is saying enough about it to satisfy people of

all

ages

will

who

disagree about life or totality. Hie balance of artist and reader,
therefore, is riot a

pivotal

point where most agree an the artist's

perception of totality, but where
a totality

which

most

agree that he is portraying

defies finite definition. Agreement about an

artist's perception of a particular totality (the "naturalist's"
world) creates an orthodox, popular work, popular for a particular

tiiae; disagreement

about an artist's particular

perception

of

a

totality that cannot be particularized, creates a classic, popular

for all tiaes.
What Jaaes does is to realize in his works the significant
relationship between the abstract and the concrete, the general and
the particular, and he realizes that awareness in terras of each—
which, of course, neans that he deals in all approximations of each:
the symbol, the idea, the image.

lie tries to give

the

particular

detail, the particular word all of the leeway it needs—a method
which actually broadens its possibilities for aaking distinctions at
the sane tino that it causes these distinctions to be raade.

The

*7"Hie novel is of all pictures the most comprehensive and the
most elastic. It will stretch anywhere—it will take in absolutely
anything , .
Janes, Hie Future of the Move!, op. cit., p. 33.
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fact that

gives his words

he

rein" actually forces one to

"full

examine the "particular case" with much more zeal than one might do
otherwise.
what the
is,

givin?, the wore! full play, he forces one to find out

fly

particular case (of which

the

word is a representative)

really

instead of letting one assuae that the "word" (its general

symbolical

significance) is

explanation

enough of the object's

existence.
The essence of Jaaesian
ness to make its
upon what is

subtlety

own extensions.

unsaid

is that it frees the conscious

Subtlety, that is, depends as

much

as said; it presumes awareness that what is un

spoken (or left open to interpretation) is far taore effective at
tiroes than

what

is explained away—if only

because

words limit

consciousness at the saae ti»e that they facilitate it.
crystaline,

in

the

way that

Janes

tries to keep

theia,

By remaining

words pry up

greater aeaning by depending upon the total leverage of all that
human minds can read into tiiera.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that
so

much

emphasis upon the free

word,

upon

the

word

jaore "real" than
"superior;"

it

Janes puts

on the "representation," on the

"image,"— ("Hie image is always prior to the
looks

because

thing

itself")-that he

or the image or the representation as something

the

say be

fact. It may, in the classical sense, be
something

"more," than reality; but James does

not necessarily mean that it is isore "real."
James valued "differences," "relationship,"*® the contraries
18
This is tine ©esthetic's approach, which assumes that reality
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of life as nuch as absolutes,

He found in the representation of

life real significance, but he did not say they are more real.

They

right hold life and reflect life and be like life, and even more
perfectly

realise life than people do; they nay even be nore paradoxi

cal and bewildering; but this does not isean that life, to Jamas, was
any

loss real because of what the artist's representations can do

roaler,

Jaaes

did not fall into that trap.

In fact the full thrust

of his irony, of his knowledge of paradox, o£ his ability to weave
illusion and reality, is directed at this kind of consciousness.
Professing no absolute vision of mystical truth, .Jaaes still
realizes awareness of such by Mirroring, not eliminating, contraries.
As before stated, a paradoxical condition of life is as auch a result
of

language as of fact*

Even the word, "paradox," is an arbitrary

is found not in one's involvement in "facts," or illusions in general,
but only in life's representations. It sees truth only in the way
something fulfills its obligation as an example—>as a syjabolieal
approximation of another example. That is, it finds "representation,"
generally, to be acre "real than what it represents; it finds in
life's artifacts its only real central and meaningful entity. This
kind of consciousness eventually even looks upon itself as purely
another representative. It denies itself "classical uniqueness."
To this kind of consciousness, whatever reality is (whether
it is a concrete fact or an abstract idea or a classical combination
of the two), the syabol of it is far more vital. Such a consciousness seldom touches upon life itself; instead it lives in its
approximations, since life for such a consciousness is not itself
real. Hhat is considered real is esipty synbolisc. Hiis is an
empty paradoxical position which apparently recognizes no relation
ship in the symbol to either a finite fact or an infinite idea. The
symbol sight be referred to as an approximation of one or th® other;
it might be referred to as an "objective correlative," for instance,
but what is meant by such a comparison is that the object or idea
more perfectly approximates the symbolI
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fulcrum by which me balances contraries which possibly do not
exist at all in total reality. Dualistic words, like "good and
evil," "beauty and ugliness," "reality and illusion," manage to
halve the world into contraries which may not exist at all except
in the minds of those who use thera. They are symbolical approxima
tions, no more or less, and Jaiaes must have realized this.
But not to jairror contraries would be not to mirror the world
as it appears to the ncm-mystic; and whatever paradox implies as a
total condition, James accepted it, temporarily, as a conditicm only
slightly aore central, possibly, that the conventions (illusions)
it opposes.
By maintaining, in other words, a propensity towards "classical
inclusiveness," Jaaes satisfied not only the classicist, but the
mystic as well. For what the classicist calls "finding the uni
versal significance in the particular" is very similar (except in
degree and intensity of awareness) to what the mystic calls "appre
hending the Infinite within tli© finite," Both approaches to reality
19
aim at a union of contraries,

19
The primary difference between these two approaches to
reality is that the mystic asserts that—once having tal a mystical
vision—he knows that a condition exists beyond paradox, beyond,
that is, the contraries that paradox implies, a condition in which
the abstract and the concrete are inseparably indivisible—whereas
the classicist only assuaes it, meanwhile hoping to capture a
balance of meaning within the limits of paradox itself.
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When Van Wyck Brooks» therefore, says of Jaiaes's characters
that they are the "fruits of an irresponsible imagination, of a
deranged sense of values, of a mind working in a void, uncorrected
by any clear consciousness of human cause and effect,"20 what Brooks
is really demanding is final moral judgment.
But to give final noral judgments, one has to b® an absolutist;
and like Conrad and Melville and others of their caliber, Janes is
not a moral absolutist.21 He is only an absolutist of technique.
He aerely portrays, diligently, the battleground where good and evil,
beauty and ugliness, reality and illusion vie with one another for
supremacy, a world in which the innocent seek the knowledge of the
non-innocent, lose their innocence when they think they have this
knowledge, and then, in innocent ignorance of this knowledge, become
innocent again. The truly innocent, as Jaoes says of Isabelle Archer,
are those in whom "the love of knowledge co-exists with the finest
capacity for ignorance."
Jaaes evidently felt he himself maintained innocence by resaining out of his stories, by letting the reader sake most of the
judgments and assumptions needing to be made. His morality, such as
it is, is that his characters ostensibly retreat fron evil, if they
think they have recognized it. The ambiguity inheent is that one

20

Van i/yck Brooks, New England Indian Summer, 1865-1915. op. cit.

21
They are all three moralists, but not moral absolutists.
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cannot tell for sure with whom or What lie raakes ignorance synony
mous: ignorance or knowledge, the Americans or Europeans, etc. He
implies that the process of recognition warps, if it does not actually
destroy; or that if it does not ivarp, it offers no escape. Jaaes's
character Searle, in "A Passionate Pilgrim," says: "I was born with
a soul for the picturesque ... 1 found it nowhere. I found the
world all !;arsh linos and harsh light, without shade, without compo
sition, without the lovely ssystery of colour." Janes went to Europe
to enrich his esthetic soul, aid he learned there that sensitivity,
like knowledge, can corrupt. lie apjiroachcd the beauty and art of
Europe as a Puritan would approach the sensuality of Pursla. It
seemed to hold for hio the suae kind of fascination, and it always
seoned just out of his reach; he was always excluded fron the "iaagic
circle." As Blackiaur says of James's kind of artist: "ho fairly
22

ached to corrupt hiisself."

Cut he found like Christopher Newman that "Europe keeps holding
one

at am's length." The

he reraained,
soc.-is

the

to

03tnctically

have

inevitable

tragedy

of James, as a person,

and morally, a virgin to the

fult utterly corrupted himself. He

seems

end:

himself

that

he never

is always

innocent in all his works; as if he never thrust through

the mystery whose corrupting aid re-generating he witnessed all around
his. ilis morality, as such, is that his hero or heroine try to reject

22

R. P. jilaekxiur, "The Country of the Blue," essay in The
Question of .lenry Jaiaes, op. cit., p. 103.

10S

ultimate knowledge, too. They retreat from evil or ugliness (or just
plain isystery) rather than remain with it, unless, like Isabelle
Archer and Daisy Miller, thoy retreat too late*
Ja®es, as a person, never does seem to lose control—to enter his
"Trie

Country of the Blue." ile seems to remain always the observing

artist and, secondarily, the human beinf;j and although his art seldom
falters, his humanity becomes suspect. It does not seem really tested,
isccause of his highly developed esthetic sense, which would not let
him pursue ugliness too far, his morality seems to fall short of
real depth (of the kind, for instance, which Conrad reveals by some
of the saroe methods). And because of this, his art finally falls
under suspicion, too.
Yet it is quite possible that the evil or ugliness which James
snjfiests--£or whatever reasons he does so—sore effectively reveal
real sordidness than would the most explicit nataing of particulars.
James saw himself as a romantic, end he is nsost often referred
to by criticis as such. But his saanner is too incisive to put up
with illusion, except for its own sake, lie was more a manipulator
of romance than a romanticist, "The Art of the romancer," he said,
"is for the fun of it, insidiously to cut the cable, to cut it
without our detecting his," Janes could cut-tho-cable on his readers,
but not «n his own ironic sensibility, sic constructed marvelously
ingenious labyrinths, "catching" inside the labyrinths those who
could be caught, remaining himself always in awe of those who could
be caught (the Daisy Millers, the Isabelle Archers, the Maggie
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Vervors), lie remained in awe, in other words, of those who respond
imaginatively and unnechaitically to life—those who seess truly
Mysterious !>ecause they are truly involved in mystery, lie hiasclf
seenod never able to imaerse himself in what he considered the real
substance of life--which is, ironically, "lw:wildenaent," lie could
not seea to do, as Conrad insisted one should: "ianerse himself in
the destructive element,"
For this reason James cannot really I« considered a tragedian.
His heroes, for or© thin?, seldor» recognize their tragic flaw; and
when, like Marcher in 'Tlie Beast in the Jungle," they do—no
catharsis is there. Even Strether in The Ambassadors, vho corns
close to sseinn himself, never makes the bridge with life which
rsi*ht brinf hin into a taeaningful relationship with the world,
Isabelle Archer is the closest of all to being a tragic figure in
.Tnrses's fiction; but, as with ataost all of his protagonists (even
those women in his later works), her alternatives are not truly
tragic,
"or is Jsues a r. oralistj his illusions, which appear to
deliniato between good and evil, fail to do so, aid reesain ambiguous.
And he is not really a rtystic either; because he does not see how
the infinite reflections of act and consequence resolve themselves
J*\
into a hamonious totality which is steaningftil
because everything
in that totality is seen to be equally responsible. This is knowledge

2\
Or totally discordant, according to the mystic who soes it—
that is, according to whether he is a "white" or "blade" nystic.
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the nystic begins with; it is knowled?;© the tragedian approaches;
it is knowledge the moralist defends or renounces—quite often
arbitrarily. It is knowledge the ironist never completely accepts,
one way or the other.
what Jafiies is, siuply, is an ironist--neith©r excessively
romantic, or excessively misanthropic, ae is somewhere between—
outside ids "Country of the iJlue."
iiut this does not wean that his works are outside it, that they
do not see, do not save. They siuply avoid absolutes; and in that
sense they accurately sirror one aspect of lifts—tlie fact that life
seems to be anbivalent and paradoxical. And in that sense they seeta
to be real.
Conrad, discussing Janes, is nost definitive on this point.
if© says: "James's characters renounce the shadows;" and he says
that such a solution by rejections
. . . must always present a certain lack of
finality, especially startling when contrasted
with the usual methods of solution by rewards
mid punishments, by crowned love, by fortune,
by a broken leg, or a sudden death ... Why
the reading public, which as a body, has never
laid upon a story-teller the corsnand to be an
artist, should demand for hia this shame of
divine omnipotence, is utterly incomprehensible.
But so it is; and these solutions are legitimate
inasmuch as they satisfy the desire for finality,
for which our hearts yearn with a longing greater
than the longing for the loaves and fishes of
the earth. . «

24Joseph

Conrad, The juostion of Henry Janes, (od.) F. i>.
Dupec, ag, cit., p, 45.
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Conrad concludes: "One is never set at rest by Mr. Henry
Jaaes's novels, ilis book ends as an episode in life ends. You
remain with the sense of life still poinj? on."
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